WO2006071610A1 - Mechanism to determine trust of out-of band management agents - Google Patents

Mechanism to determine trust of out-of band management agents Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2006071610A1
WO2006071610A1 PCT/US2005/045998 US2005045998W WO2006071610A1 WO 2006071610 A1 WO2006071610 A1 WO 2006071610A1 US 2005045998 W US2005045998 W US 2005045998W WO 2006071610 A1 WO2006071610 A1 WO 2006071610A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
management agent
bit
resources
access
trusted environment
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2005/045998
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Andrew J. Fish
Original Assignee
Intel Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Intel Corporation filed Critical Intel Corporation
Priority to GB0714632A priority Critical patent/GB2437215B/en
Priority to DE112005003340T priority patent/DE112005003340B4/en
Publication of WO2006071610A1 publication Critical patent/WO2006071610A1/en

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/74Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information operating in dual or compartmented mode, i.e. at least one secure mode
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/52Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow

Definitions

  • Out-of-band management agents such as intelligent platform
  • Figure 2 illustrates one embodiment of a central processing unit
  • Figure 3 is a diagram of one embodiment of a trusted or secured
  • Pentium® IV processors available from Intel Corporation of
  • cache 220 may have various features
  • private memory 225 may be external to and separate from cache memory
  • ICH 140 provides an interface to input/output (I/O) devices within hub interface.
  • out-of-band management agent 390 is an entity that operates
  • agent 390 in out-of-band agent 390 to certify that agent 390 is secure.
  • register 120 is checked to determine the security status of out-of-band agent 390.
  • platform 300 can attest to if the system 100 hardware (e.g., hardware 380) is in a
  • out-of-band agent 390 is untrusted, resulting in hardware 390 preventing access

Abstract

According to one embodiment, computer system is disclosed. The computer system includes a central processing unit (CPU) to simultaneously operate a trusted environment and an untrusted environemt and a chipset coupled to the CPU. The chipset includes an interface to couple to a management agent, and protected registers having a bit to indicate if the management agent is provided access to resources within the trusted environment.

Description

MECHANISM TO DETERMINE TRUST OF OUT-OF-B AND
MANAGEMENT AGENTS
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
[0001] Contained herein is material that is subject to copyright
protection. The copyright owner has no objection to the facsimile
reproduction of the patent disclosure by any person as it appears in the Patent
and Trademark Office patent files or records, but otherwise reserves all rights
to the copyright whatsoever.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
[0002] The present invention relates to computer systems; more
particularly, the present invention relates to computer systems that may
operate in a trusted or secured environment.
BACKGROUND
[0003] The increasing number of financial and personal transactions
being performed on local or remote microcomputers has given impetus for
the establishment of "trusted" or "secured" microprocessor environments.
The problem these environments try to solve is that of loss of privacy, or data
being corrupted or abused. Users do not want their private data made public.
They also do not want their data altered or used in inappropriate transactions. Examples of these include unintentional release of medical records or
electronic theft of funds from an on-line bank or other depository. Similarly,
content providers seek to protect digital content (for example, music, other
audio, video, or other types of data in general) from being copied without
authorization.
[0004] Out-of-band management agents, such as intelligent platform
management interface (IPMI) controllers, may need to access resources within
a computer system. However, access to the system by out-of-band
management agent access could be used to facilitate a security attack.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0005] The invention is illustrated by way of example and not limitation in
the figures of the accompanying drawings, in which like references indicate
similar elements, and in which:
[0006] Figure 1 is a block diagram of one embodiment of a computer
system;
[0007] Figure 2 illustrates one embodiment of a central processing unit;
[0008] Figure 3 is a diagram of one embodiment of a trusted or secured
software environment; and
[0009] Figure 4 is a flow diagram of one embodiment of providing access
to trusted resources.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0010] A mechanism to provide an out-of-band management agent access
to a secured computer system is described. According to one embodiment, a
trusted port in the computer system is implemented to transmit encryption keys
to a USB peripheral without using a USB stack.
[0011] In the following detailed description of the present invention
numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough
understanding of the present invention. However, it will be apparent to one
skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without these
specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown
in block diagram form, rather than in detail, in order to avoid obscuring the
present invention.
[0012] Reference in the specification to "one embodiment" or "an
embodiment" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic
described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one
embodiment of the invention. The appearances of the phrase "in one
embodiment" in various places in the specification are not necessarily all
referring to the same embodiment.
[0013] Figure 1 is a block diagram of one embodiment of a computer
system 100. Computer system 100 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 102 coupled to bus 105. In one embodiment, CPU 102 is a processor in the Pentium®
family of processors including the Pentium® II processor family, Pentium® III
processors, and Pentium® IV processors available from Intel Corporation of
Santa Clara, California. Alternatively, other CPUs may be used.
[0014] According to one embodiment, CPU 102 includes circuits or logic
elements to support secure or trusted operations. For example, CPU 102 may
include secure enter (SENTER) logic, not shown, to support the execution of
special SENTER instructions that may initiate trusted operations, which may
curtail the ability of potentially hostile untrusted code to access secure resources
within computer system 100.
[0015] Additionally, CPU 102 may include secure memory to support
secure operations. Figure 2 is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of
CPU 102. CPU 102 includes cache memory (cache) 220, embedded key 230, and
page table (PT) registers 240. All or part of cache 220 may include, or be
convertible to, private memory (PM) 225. According to one embodiment, private
memory 225 is a memory with sufficient protections to prevent access to it by
any unauthorized device (e.g., any device other than the associated CPU 102)
while activated as a private memory.
[0016] In the illustrated embodiment, cache 220 may have various features
to permit its selective isolation as a private memory. In another embodiment not shown, private memory 225 may be external to and separate from cache memory
220, but still associated with CPU 102. Key 230 may be an embedded key to be
used for encryption, decryption, and/or validation of various blocks of data
and/or code. PT registers 240 may be a table in the form of registers to identify
memory pages that are to be accessible only by protected code, and which
memory pages are not to be protected.
[0017] Referring back to Figure 1, a chipset 107 is also coupled to bus 105.
Chipset 107 includes a memory control hub (MCH) 110. MCH 110 may include a
memory controller 112 that is coupled to a main system memory 115. Main
system memory 115 stores data and sequences of instructions that are executed
by CPU 102 or any other device included in system 100. In one embodiment,
main system memory 115 includes dynamic random access memory (DRAM);
however, main system memory 115 may be implemented using other memory
types. Additional devices may also be coupled to bus 105, such as multiple
CPUs and/or multiple system memories.
[0018] Memory 115 may include a protected memory table to define
which memory blocks (where a memory block is a range of contiguously
addressable memory locations) in memory 115 are to be inaccessible to direct
memory access (DMA) transfers. Since all accesses to memory 115 go through
MCH 110, MCH 110 may check the protected memory table before permitting any DMA transfer to take place. In a particular embodiment, MCH 110 may use
caching techniques to reduce the number of necessary accesses to protected
memory table 320.
[0019] According to one embodiment, MCH 110 includes key 116 to be
used in various encryption, decryption and/or validation processes, protected
registers 120 and protected memory table 125. In one embodiment, the protected
memory table 125 is implemented in MCH 110 as protected memory table 125
and the protected memory table in memory 115 may be eliminated.
[0020] In another embodiment, protected memory table 125 is
implemented as the protected memory table in memory 115 as previously
described and protected memory table 125 may be eliminated. The protected
memory table may also be implemented in other ways not shown. Regardless of
physical location, the purpose and basic operation of the protected memory table
may be substantially as described.
[0021] In one embodiment, protected registers 120 are registers that are
writable by commands that may only be initiated by trusted microcode in CPU
102. Protected microcode is microcode whose execution may be initiated by
authorized instruction(s) and/or by hardware that is not controllable by
unauthorized devices.
[0022] In one embodiment, protected registers 120 include a register to enable or disable the use of the protected memory table. Protected registers 120
may also include a writable register identifying the location of the protected
memory table so that the location does not have to be hardwired into MCH 110.
In a further embodiment, protected registers 120 may include a mode bit to
determine the level of access for an out-of-band management agent, as will be
discussed below in greater detail.
[0023] MCH HO is coupled to an input/output control hub (ICH) 140 via a
hub interface. ICH 140 provides an interface to input/output (I/O) devices within
computer system 100. ICH 140 may support standard I/O operations on I/O
busses such as peripheral component interconnect (PCI), accelerated graphics
port (AGP), universal serial bus (USB), low pin count (LPC) bus, or any other
kind of I/O bus (not shown). An interface may be used to connect chipset 107
with token 130. Physical token 130 may be a circuit to protect data related to
creating and maintaining a protected operating environment.
[0024] In a particular embodiment, physical token 130 includes a key (not
shown), which may be an embedded key to be used for specific encryption,
decryption and/or validation processes. Physical token 130 may also include
storage space to be used to hold a digest value and other information to be used
in the protected operating environment. In one embodiment the storage space in
physical token 130 may include non-volatile memory (e.g., flash memory) to retain its contents in the event of power loss to the physical token.
[0025] A secure Virtual Machine Monitor 130 module may be stored on a
system disk or other mass storage, and moved or copied to other locations as
necessary. In one embodiment, prior to beginning a secure launch process
monitor 160 may be moved or copied to one or more memory pages in memory
115. Following a secure enter process, a virtual machine environment may be
created in which monitor 160 may operate as the most privileged code within the
system, and may be used to permit or deny direct access to certain system
resources by the operating system or applications within the created virtual
machines.
[0026] Once execution control is transferred to monitor 160, computer
system 100 enters a trusted or secured software environment (or platform).
Figure 3 illustrates one embodiment of a trusted or secured platform 300. In the
Figure 3 embodiment, trusted and untrusted software may be loaded
simultaneously and may execute simultaneously on a single computer system.
Monitor 160 selectively permits or prevents direct access to hardware resources
390 from one or more untrusted operating systems 340 and untrusted
applications 310.
[0027] In this context, "untrusted" does not necessarily mean that the
operating system or applications are deliberately misbehaving, but that the size and variety of interacting code makes it impractical to reliably assert that the
software is behaving as desired, and that there are no viruses or other foreign
code interfering with its execution. In a typical embodiment, the untrusted code
might include the normal operating system and applications found on today's
personal computers.
[0028] Monitor 160 also selectively permits or prevents direct access to
hardware resources 380 from one or more trusted or secure kernels 360 and one
or more trusted applications 370. Such a trusted or secure kernel 360 and trusted
applications 370 may be limited in size and functionality to aid in the ability to
perform trust analysis upon it. The trusted application 370 may be any software
code, program, routine, or set of routines which is executable in a secure
environment. Thus, the trusted application 370 may be a variety of applications,
or code sequences, or may be a relatively small application such as a Java applet.
[0029] Instructions or operations normally performed by operating system
340 or kernel 360 that could alter system resource protections or privileges may
be trapped by monitor 160, and selectively permitted, partially permitted, or
rejected. As an example, in a typical embodiment, instructions that change the
CPU 102 page table that would normally be performed by operating system 340
or kernel 360 would instead be trapped by monitor 160, which would ensure that
the request was not attempting to change page privileges outside the domain of its virtual machine.
[0030] Also shown in Figure 3, is an out-of-band management agent 390.
In one embodiment, out-of-band management agent 390 is an entity that operates
software separate from computer system 100. Out-of-band management agent
390 may be implemented as an intelligent platform management interface (IPMI)
controller, or other types of service processors. In one embodiment, out-of-band
management agent 390 is a virtual machine or a partition of a larger system, such
as another computer system or network system.
[0031] According to one embodiment, the mode bit within protected
registers 120 enables out-of-band agent 390 to access or modify trusted or secure
resources within platform 300. In such an embodiment, out-of-band agent 390 is
treated as a trusted component if the mode bit is enabled. Thus, platform 300 can
attest to the ability to trust out-of-band agent 390. However, out-of-band agent
390 is to be trusted in order for platform 300 to be trusted.
[0032] In one embodiment, third party review is conducted of all the code
in out-of-band agent 390 to certify that agent 390 is secure. In further
embodiments, the third party review may also certify that agent 390 is to
maintain secrets, perform cryptographic strength encryption and attestation.
Once agent 390 is certified, the mode bit may be enabled.
[0033] If out-of-band agent 390 is not certified the mode bit is disabled, indicating that agent 390 is not to be trusted. As a result, out-of-band agent 390
is not permitted to affect the trust of platform 300, and platform 300 can be
trusted without attesting to the trust of out-of-band agent 390.
[0034] Figure 4 is a flow diagram of one embodiment for providing access
of platform 300to an out-of-band agent 390. At processing block 410, a request is
received from out-of-band agent 390 to access the resources of computer system
100, particularly platform 300. It processing block 420, the mode bit within
register 120 is checked to determine the security status of out-of-band agent 390.
[0035] At decision block 430, it is determined whether the mode bit is
enabled. If the mode bit is enabled, out-of-band agent 390 is trusted and is
permitted to access trusted resources, processing block 440. Trusted code on
platform 300 can attest to if the system 100 hardware (e.g., hardware 380) is in a
mode that requires trusting out-of-band agent 390. If the mode bit is disabled,
out-of-band agent 390 is untrusted, resulting in hardware 390 preventing access
to any trusted resource in computer system 100.
[0036] The above-described mechanism enables a single chipset to be used
with both trusted and untrusted out-of-band agents, as well as to be able to attest
to the need to trust the out-of-band agent.
[0037] Whereas many alterations and modifications of the present
invention will no doubt become apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art after having read the foregoing description, it is to be understood that any
particular embodiment shown and described by way of illustration is in no way
intended to be considered limiting. Therefore, references to details of various
embodiments are not intended to limit the scope of the claims, which in
themselves recite only those features regarded as essential to the invention.

Claims

CLAIMSWhat is claimed is:
1. A computer system comprising:
a central processing unit (CPU) to simultaneously operate a trusted
environment and an untrusted environment; and
a chipset, coupled to the CPU, including:
an interface to couple to a management agent; and
protected registers having a bit to indicate if the management
agent is provided access to resources within the trusted environment.
2. The computer system of claim 1 wherein the management agent is
permitted to access the resources within the trusted environment if the bit is
enabled.
3. The computer system of claim 2 wherein the management agent is
permitted to modify the resources within the trusted environment if the bit is
enabled.
4. The computer system of claim 1 wherein the management agent is not
permitted to access the resources within the trusted environment if the bit is
disabled.
5. The computer system of claim 4 wherein the management agent is
permitted to access resources within the untrusted environment if the bit is
disabled.
6. A method comprising:
receiving a request from a management agent to access a computer system
simultaneously operating a trusted environment and an untrusted environment;
and
determining if a bit within a protected register is enabled; and
permitting the management agent to access resources within the trusted
environment if the bit is enabled.
7. The method of claim 6 further comprising permitting the management
agent to modify the resources within the trusted environment if the bit is
enabled.
8. The method of claim 6 further comprising preventing the management
agent from accessing the resources within the trusted environment if the bit is
disabled.
9. The method of claim 6 further comprising permitting the management
agent to access resources within the untrusted environment if the bit is disabled.
10. A system comprising:
an out-of-band management agent; and
a computer system platform to simultaneously host a trusted environment
and an untrusted environment, the computer system platform including an
integrated circuit (IC) having:
an interface to couple to the out-of-band management agent; and
protected registers having a bit to indicate if the management
agent is provided access to resources within the trusted environment.
11. The system of claim 10 wherein the management agent is permitted to
access the resources within the trusted environment if the bit is enabled.
12. The system of claim 11 wherein the management agent is permitted to
modify the resources within the trusted environment if the bit is enabled.
13. The system of claim 10 wherein the management agent is not permitted to
access the resources within the trusted environment if the bit is disabled.
14. The system of claim 13 wherein the management agent is permitted to
access resources within the untrusted environment if the bit is disabled.
15. The system of claim 10 wherein the management agent is a virtual
machine of a second computer system platform.
16. An article of manufacture including one or more computer readable
media that embody a program of instructions, wherein the program of
instructions, when executed by a processing unit, causes the processing unit to:
receive a request from a management agent to access a computer system
simultaneously operating a trusted environment and an untrusted environment;
and
determine if a bit within a protected register is enabled; and
permit the management agent to access resources within the trusted
environment if the bit is enabled.
17. The article of manufacture of claim 16 wherein the program of
instructions, when executed by a processing unit, further causes the processing
unit to permit the management agent to modify the resources within the trusted
environment if the bit is enabled.
18. The article of manufacture of claim 16 wherein the program of
instructions, when executed by a processing unit, further causes the processing
unit to prevent the management agent from accessing the resources within the
trusted environment if the bit is disabled.
19. The article of manufacture of claim 16 wherein the program of instructions, when executed by a processing unit, further causes the processing unit to permit the management agent to access resources within the untrusted environment if the bit is disabled.
PCT/US2005/045998 2004-12-29 2005-12-19 Mechanism to determine trust of out-of band management agents WO2006071610A1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0714632A GB2437215B (en) 2004-12-29 2005-12-19 Mechanism to determine trust of out-of band management agents
DE112005003340T DE112005003340B4 (en) 2004-12-29 2005-12-19 Mechanism for determining the trustworthiness of out-of-band management agents

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11/025,751 US8533777B2 (en) 2004-12-29 2004-12-29 Mechanism to determine trust of out-of-band management agents
US11/025,751 2004-12-29

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Publication Number Publication Date
WO2006071610A1 true WO2006071610A1 (en) 2006-07-06

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DE (1) DE112005003340B4 (en)
GB (1) GB2437215B (en)
TW (1) TWI310515B (en)
WO (1) WO2006071610A1 (en)

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