WO2004021406A2 - Method and apparatus for multi-level security implementation - Google Patents

Method and apparatus for multi-level security implementation Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2004021406A2
WO2004021406A2 PCT/US2003/027354 US0327354W WO2004021406A2 WO 2004021406 A2 WO2004021406 A2 WO 2004021406A2 US 0327354 W US0327354 W US 0327354W WO 2004021406 A2 WO2004021406 A2 WO 2004021406A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
information
card
processors
processing
data
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2003/027354
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2004021406A3 (en
Inventor
Peter O. Luthi
Original Assignee
Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc. filed Critical Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc.
Priority to AU2003263040A priority Critical patent/AU2003263040A1/en
Priority to EP03791993.3A priority patent/EP1546896B1/en
Publication of WO2004021406A2 publication Critical patent/WO2004021406A2/en
Publication of WO2004021406A3 publication Critical patent/WO2004021406A3/en

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0485Networking architectures for enhanced packet encryption processing, e.g. offloading of IPsec packet processing or efficient security association look-up
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/62Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/105Multiple levels of security
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2113Multi-level security, e.g. mandatory access control
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0464Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general

Abstract

A method of operating a multi-level security system including the steps of providing a plurality of processors (54, 60, 68, 69). At least some of said processors (54, 60) are equipped with a data card (56, 62) which permits simultaneous processing of different classification levels (58, 64) of information and the dynamic reallocation of processors to different classification levels.

Description

METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION
Cross Reference to Related Application
This application claims rights under U.S. Provisional Patent Application Serial No.
60/406,758 filed August 29, 2002
Background of the Invention
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to signal and data processing, and in particular to
methods and apparatus for granting privileged access to data and files by direct or indirect
means. Still more particularly, the present invention relates to methods and apparatus for
dynamically and automatically changing the classification level of processing elements.
2. Brief Description of Prior Developments
A multi-level security system is a system, which is capable of processing
unclassified data, CONFIDENTIAL data, SECRET data, TOP SECRET data all in the
same system. The conventional way that this function has been carried out is to
physically separate processors. Some processors are dedicated to processing unclassified
information while other processors are dedicated to processing SECRET information and
still other processors are dedicated to processing TOP SECRET information. A possible
problem with the above described approach is that at any instant in time the system may
have much more unclassified information to process than classified information. The system may not, therefore, have enough processors to run the unclassified information,
while other processors dedicated to classified information may be relatively underused.
Multi-level security has been implemented before in large networks and in systems that are custom designed but have not been implemented using commercial off
the shelf processor boards in an embedded processing system.
A need therefore exists for a multi-level security system which efficiently makes use of all available computer assets. A need also exists for a multi-level security system which is capable of making use of off the shelf or other computers which may be readily available through commercial sources.
Summary of Invention
The present invention is a small data card that fits on top of the board which allows the security level of the processor to be dynamically changed by changing the keying information in the data card. This data card is called the virtual private network (VPN) card and it serves to implement the multi-level security system.
The data card which is included in the apparatus and method of the invention along with appropriate software that is an interface to a data fabric. The particular data fabric that we are pursuing currently is gigabit Ethernet although any data fabric would
apply to this invention. The data fabric comes over the top of the circuit card, comes into the data card and goes into a government approved encryption device. The encryption
device itself is conventional and well known to those skilled in the are and.is available from various vendors and these are approved for use on encrypting classified information.
Information is decrypted when it comes on to the board and encrypted when it comes off
the board. This data card is always used in sets of cards and the basic concept is that when classified information at for example, the SECRET level needs to be transferred from one board to another board at the SECRET level that goes through the data card
becomes encrypted and is put on the data fabric encrypted so that it is no longer classified information. It is then transferred over to the circuit card and it is decrypted and then sent to the commercial processing board where it is processed. Only cards that have the same key can process the SECRET information. The user has another circuit card with the VPN processing data at, for example, the CONFIDENTIAL level. Any attempt to send information from a SECRET module to a CONFIDENTIAL module will not succeed. "" The module will have a different key and that information will not be properly decrypted so it will not be received by the CONFIDENTIAL processing module. The user or controlling software then is provided a means to change the classification level of a processing card without any physical changes. For example, if a CONFIDENTIAL card wants to or needs to be changed or reallocated to SECRET processing, the trusted system software will zeroize the circuit card, clearing all the information of it, give it the SECRET level key and now that processor, which used to process CONFIDENTIAL information, is now capable of processing SECRET information. The VPN card provides
the physical red/black boundary, making it possible to use commercial boards for ϊlassified processing, the unclassified information (black side) being the data.fabric and the classified information (red side) being on the circuit card is on the data card. The user does not have to have any red/black boundaries on the commercial circuit card. The VPN
card satisfies the requirements imposed by the government to implement the red/black
boundary, some of those include tempest and encryption and these are all concentrated on to the small data card so that the user does not have to design the entire circuit card to the
government specifications.
For purpose of this disclosure, the term "red" refers to all types of classified information generally and the term "black" refers to unclassified information.
As used hereafter "pink", "purple" and "orange" are classes of "red"
Brief Description of the Drawings
The present invention is further described with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:
Figure la is a front perspective view of a commercial off the shelf (COTS) processor board with a virtual private network (VPN) encryptor peripheral component interconnect mezzanine card (PMC) daughter card which comprises a preferred embodiment of the method of the present invention;
Figure lb is a schematic diagram showing the operation of the COTS processor
and VPN encryptor shown in Figure la; Figure 2 is a schematic diagram showing a method by which encrypted VPN supports red/black separation on a single data fabric as is used in a preferred embodiment
of the method of the present invention;
Figure 3 is a schematic diagram showing encrypted VPN support of multi-level
security as is used in a preferred embodiment of the method of the present invention;
Figure 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating a method by which the Information Security (INFOSEC) module controls intra-level communications and key management as is used in a preferred embodiment of the method of the present invention;
Figure 5 is a schematic diagram illustrating encrypted VPN permitting dynamic allocation of assets to different security levels as is used in a preferred embodiment of the method of the present invention;
Figure 6 is a schematic diagram illustrating the implementing of a communications path with reconfigurable assets as is used in a preferred embodiment of the method of the present invention; and
Figure 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating the implementing of a jammer with reconfigurable assets as is used in a preferred embodiment of the method of the present invention.
Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiment
Referring to Figure la, there is a COTS processor board 10 on which is affixed
the VPN encryptor 12, which is a PMC daughter card that makes use of an approved
INFOSEC chip. This daughter card is designed to support red/black separation and is not
a COTS product. The processor board runs on the red side. The backplane 14 isolates
power and simple controls and forms another red/black boundary using techniques such
as filters 16 18.
The COTS processor board 20 typically includes processors and memories 22, 24,
26, and 28 which are interconnected with a data switch 30. The data switch 30 is
interconnected with a VPN encryptor 32 which has a key manager function 34 and a
zeroised function 36 which are explained in greater detail hereafter.
Referring to Figure 2, there is a COTS general purpose processor board (GPP) 38
with an encrypted VPN 40 having a key 42 which is interconnected by way of a bus 43 to
a second general purpose processor 44 with an encrypted VPN having a key 48. This key
48 is the same as key 40; therefore, data 49 contained in general purpose processor 38 is
encrypted by the VPN card 40, transferred over the data fabric of bus 43, is decrypted by
the VPN card 46 and received by general purpose processor 44. The information 49
exchanged between GPP 38 and GPP 44 (and received at GPP 44 as information 50)
cannot be intercepted by unclassified GPP 52 or GPP 53 because the data is encrypted as
it is transferred over the data fabric, or bus 43. Referring to Figure 3, GPP 54 with an encrypted VPN 56 and key 58 is shown. This GPP is interconnected through bus 59 to a general purpose processor 60 with an
encrypted VPN 62 and key 64. Key 64 is different from key 68; therefore, data or message 66 in general purpose processor 54 is not encrypted as data message 67 in GPP 60.
Still referring to Figure 3, there are two VPN cards 56 and 62 on GPP's 54 and 60 respectively which are keyed for two different classification levels, e.g. CONFIDENTIAL designated pink and SECRET designated purple and there is a message 66 which gets encrypted and gets put on the bus 59, and is sent to the GPP 60 via the VPN 62. This board tries to decrypt the message 66 with the wrong key, so that garbled information is received so it does not get the final message. All the information that goes across the data fabric is unclassified information which is either purely unclassified or classified information that has been encrypted and so unclassified GPPs 68 and 69, cannot access any classified information. Accordingly, computers at the SECRET level can talk to each other. Computers at the TOP SECRET level can talk to each other. Computers at the unclassified level can talk to each other. Computers of different classification cannot directly communicate. If, for example, a SECRET computer tries to
talk to a CONFIDENTIAL computer the information cannot go through-. The only way the user can do that is to go through a government certified device that allows that type of
information flow which is called the guard function. The guard function examines the
content of messages, rate of messages, and other message parameters and determined, by a series of pre-defined security policies, whether the information should be permitted to
cross between classification levels. So each type of GPP has a key at its own classification level and so if it is desired to change these from, for example, from TOP SECRET to SECRET, first the trusted software of this implementation deletes the keys
and that makes the two boards unclassified. The key management function of this implementation then provides new keys. For example, if the user wants to change to the CONFIDENTIAL level he can have four boards that can run at the CONFIDENTIAL level. The user can also use the same boards to process unclassified information by zero zing the key. Now the user can run the GPP at the bypass mode and can run unclassified information on it.
Referring to Figure 4, there is an INFOSEC module with a VPN card 64 with keys 66, 68, and 70. There are also COTS general-purpose processors (GPP) with VPN cards 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, and 82. There are also unclassified.GPP=s 84, 86, 88, and 90. In this
arrangement the INFOSEC module 64 controls intra-level communications and key management. It is understood from the previous discussions that information can be passed over the data fabric or bus 91 between like classification levels, but not between different classification levels. It will be understood from Figure 4 that information can be transferred between different classification levels only by passing the information through
the trusted guard function on the INFOSEC module. It can be passed between the . unclassified GPP's 84j 86, 88 and 90. The information can also be passed directly
between the boards at one classification level 80, '82 which are the same classification level. The information can be passed between boards at a different classification level 76 and 78 and all of these information transfers can occur at the same time. If a board at one classification level at GPP 80 attempts to send information to another GPP allocated to a
different classification level at GPP 74 that information cannot be passed as was
described in connection with Figure 3. Instead, that information must got through an information security module which contains the keys for all classification levels and includes a trusted guard function which implements the security policies for sending information between different classification levels. If COTS GPP 82 has information that needs to be sent to COTS GPP 72 which is operating at a different classification level it is first sent to the INFOSEC module. The data is encrypted by the VPN at GPP 82, goes across the data. fabric, is decrypted by the .VPN with the orange key. That information and then checked by the trusted guard function. If it meets the security policies, it is re- encrypted with the pink GPP 72 and the information is then sent over the data fabric encrypted with that key, decrypted by the VPN on processor 72 and the information then .can be received.
Referring to Figure 5, there is an INFOSEC module with VPN card 92 with keys 94, 96, and 98. There are also COTS GPP's with VPN cards 100, 102, 104, 106, 108, and 110 which have respectively keys 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, and 122. There are also
unclassified GPP=s 124, 126, 128, and 130. In this arrangement the encrypted VPN
permits dynamic allocation of assets to different security levels. It will be understood
from Figure 5 that the classification level of processors can be changed by the trusted software by deleting the key in the VPM module, zeroizing the COTS processor, which means wiping out any information in the memory, and reloading it with a different key.
In this way the COTS processor can dynamically change from one classification level to another without the need to effect any physical changes to the system.
Referring to Figure 6, an arrangement is shown with an antenna 132, a T/R switch
134, a tuner 136, an FPGA card 138, GPP's with VPN cards 140 and 142, which in this instance are set to perform unclassified processing, government authorized cryptographic equipment 144 implemented on the INFOSEC modules discussed earlier, and red side processing GPP with VPN card 146. There is also a user interface (17F) with VPN card 148 as well as another GPP with VPN card 150, an exciter with VPN card 152, a PA 154, a T/R switch 156 and an antenna 158. It will be understood from Figure 6 and figure 7 generally, that one possible application of the invention in which the user has a multi- mission system which is to be capable of simultaneously performing communications, signal intelligence (SIGINT) and jamming. Conventionally these three capabilities are implemented by three totally separate systems and the security approach used today would prohibit those functions from being implemented simultaneously in the same system. It will be understood that the method and apparatus of this invention can allow information to be separated and allows the two functions to occur simultaneously. The solid line shows the receive communications path from the antenna 158 being received by
the tuner 136 implementing a modem in the FPGA card 138 in the black side general .
purpose processor 140. Additional black side processing occurring on the general purpose processor 142. Information then goes to the crypto device 144 which may be the
INFOSEC module 144 described in connection with Figure 6. The information then gets
the key change as described on Figure 4 and is sent to the classified processing on the general purpose processor 146 is then sent out to the user to receive the data through the
user interface 148. The information to be transmitted from the user out the radio communication functions is received by the user interface 148 as SECRET level data and is sent over to a GPP the same classification level where the red side processing of the radio occurs. It is then sent over the data fabric to the crypto logical device located on the information security module 144 where the data is encrypted for transmission. From where it goes to the transmit black side processing at GPP 142 it then goes to a GPP 150 also on the black side where the transmit half of the modem is prepared, over the VPN in this case in the bypass mode because data is being transferred from a black processor to a black processor, out to the excitor 152 and the information is sent through the power amplifier 154 out to the transmit receive (TR) switch 156 and transmitted out the antenna 158. In this way, the user can implement a secure radio using the invention as a reconfigurable software programmable radio.
Referring to Figure 7, an arrangement is shown in which there is a antenna 160, a tuner 162, an FPGA card 166, a GPP with VPN card 166 for signal detection, a GPP with VPN card 168 for signal identification, a guard 170 with VPN card 170", and a GPP with
VPN card 172. There is also a User _7F with VPN card 174, a GPP with VPN card 176,
an exciter with VPN card 178, a PA 180 and an antenna 182. It will be understood from Figure 7 that it is shown that the same hardware configuration used for communications
in Figure 6 can be used simultaneously for signals intelligence (SIGINT) simultaneously
with communications signal jamming. For SIGINT the target signal is received by the
antenna 160 and processed by the tuner 162 and then sent to the FPGA card 164 which
implements a fast transform FFT. That information is then passed over the switch data
fabric to the general purpose processor 166 which implements the signal detection
function. The information is then passed to provide some additional classified
processing. In order to accomplish this processing the information is sent to the guard
function on the INFOSEC module 170 where it allows information to be passed in an
unrestricted way from the unclassified side of the system to the classified side of the
system but has a means to insure that no information can accidentally be leaked back in
the other direction. The information is then encrypted with the classified level key on the
VPN card mounted on the INFOSEC module 170 and sent over to the general purpose
processor 168 which is running at the classified level. The processor then does a signal
identification. That information is further processed and sent to another computer
operating at the same classification level 172 that performs additional processing such as
target identification. That information then is reported to the user, operating at the
classified level and so it is sent across the VPN across the user interface and out to the
user. In this way the user can get the SIGINT information that was processed by the
system. Using the same hardware and running at the same time, communication signal
jamming may be accomplished. A command comes from the user to perform the jamming through the user interface 174 this is a classified level command that is then sent
over the NPN to the general-purpose processor 176. That information is then sent to the
exciter 178 where the RF signal is generated and it is sent to the power amplifier 180 and out the antenna 182.
It will be appreciated that a method and apparatus for operating a multi-level security system has been described which efficiently makes use of all available computer assets. It will also be appreciated that this method and apparatus can make use of off the shelf or other computers, which may be available through commercial sources.
While the present invention has been described in connection with the preferred embodiments of the various figures, it is to be understood that other similar embodiments may be used or modifications and additions may be made to the described embodiment for performing the same function of the present invention without deviating therefrom. Therefore, the present invention should not be limited to any single embodiment, but
rather construed in breadth and scope in accordance with the recitation of the appended claims.

Claims

ClaimsWhat is claimed is:
1. A method of operating a multi-level security system comprising the steps of
providing a plurality of processors for processing different classification level of
information; simultaneously processing said different classifications levels of
information; and reallocating at least one of said processors from processing one of
said classification levels of information to another of said classification levels of
information.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein a data card is provided for allowing the simultaneous
processing of said different classification levels of information and reallocating at
least one of said processors from processing one classification level of information to
another.
3. The method of claim 2 wherein the data card is an encryption means.
4. The method of claim 3 wherein the data card includes an information security means.
5. The method of claim 4 wherein the data card is a daughter card.
6. The method of claim 1 wherein the processors are dynamically reallocated.
7. The method of claim 1 wherein the classification levels are TOP SECRET, SECRET
and CONFIDENTIAL.
8. A multi-level security system for processing a plurality of different classification levels of information, comprising:
a plurality of processors for collectively processing information
simultaneously processing information from two or more of said plurality of different
classification levels of information; and
means for reallocating at least one of said different classification levels of
information to another one of said classification levels of information.
9. The system of claim 8 wherein the means for reallocating at least one of said different
classification levels is a data card.
10. The system of claim 9 wherein that data card is an encryption means.
11. The system of claim 10 wherein the data cards includes an information security
means.
12. The system of claim 11 wherein the data card is a daughter card.
13. The system of claim 8 wherein the means of reallocating at least one of the
processors dynamically reallocates said processors.
14. The system of claim 8 wherein the classification levels are TOP SECRET, SECRET
and CONFIDENTIAL.
15. A multi-level security system for processing a plurality of different classification
levels of information, comprising:
. a plurality of processors for collectively processing information
simultaneously processing information from two or more of said plurality of different
classification levels of information; and a data card for reallocating at least one of said different classification levels of
information to another one of said classification levels of information.
16. The system of claim 15 wherein that data card is an encryption means.
17. The system of claim 16 wherein the data cards includes an information security means.
18. The system of claim 17 wherein the data card is a daughter card.
19. The system of claim 15 wherein the means of reallocating at least one of the processors dynamically reallocates said processors.
20. The system of claim 15 wherein the classification levels are TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL.
PCT/US2003/027354 2002-08-29 2003-08-29 Method and apparatus for multi-level security implementation WO2004021406A2 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU2003263040A AU2003263040A1 (en) 2002-08-29 2003-08-29 Method and apparatus for multi-level security implementation
EP03791993.3A EP1546896B1 (en) 2002-08-29 2003-08-29 Method and apparatus for multi-level security implementation

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US40675802P 2002-08-29 2002-08-29
US60/406,758 2002-08-29
US10/334,318 2002-12-31
US10/334,318 US7958351B2 (en) 2002-08-29 2002-12-31 Method and apparatus for multi-level security implementation

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Publication Number Publication Date
WO2004021406A2 true WO2004021406A2 (en) 2004-03-11
WO2004021406A3 WO2004021406A3 (en) 2005-02-03

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EP (1) EP1546896B1 (en)
AU (1) AU2003263040A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2004021406A2 (en)

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AU2003263040A8 (en) 2004-03-19
EP1546896A2 (en) 2005-06-29
WO2004021406A3 (en) 2005-02-03
US7958351B2 (en) 2011-06-07
AU2003263040A1 (en) 2004-03-19
EP1546896A4 (en) 2010-12-15
EP1546896B1 (en) 2013-04-10
US20040044902A1 (en) 2004-03-04

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