WO2000010068A2 - Apparatus for and method of electronic currency generation, transfer and redemption - Google Patents

Abstract

An electronic form of commerce that provides acceptable levels of security while at the same time permitting anonymous electronic transfers of money substitutes, including a new form of electronic currency (3 & 4), new forms of electronic counterfeit protection, a new storage device (20) that may, but which does not have to be, used with this new form of electronic currency (3 & 4), an electronic currency generator (17 & 18) and an apparatus for tracking incoming cash reserves (21).

Description

APPARATUS FOR AND METHOD OP ELECTRONIC CURRENCY

GENERATION, TRANSFER AND REDEMPTION

I. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The present invention is directed to an apparatus for, and a method of, digitally

transferring electronic currency. Currency substitutes are not new. Present currency-

substitutes include credit cards, debit cards, checks and traveler's checks. Each of these

substitutes requires that a user's identification, as well as other forms of account

information, is provided with the transaction. Transferring user account information

increases the likelihood of theft and increases the number of theft prevention and fraud

detection measures that are required for a a reliable currency substitute.

Internet commerce and personal electric commerce has been hindered by people's

reluctance to transmit account information and identification information with each

transaction. For example using cash one can walk into a store and purchase an item

without the store or anyone knowing the person's name, household address, bank and

bank account number. Digital commerce is hindered by its lack of ability to maintain

just such anonymous forms of financial transfers while at the same time providing an

acceptable guarantee that the currency substitute is legitimate and redeemable.

Prior systems, such as that disclosed in United States Patent 5,757,917 use a complex

svs_tem of networks, confirmation codes and authorization codes. This system requires

that user obtain a cardholder account with the issuing institution. This deprives the user of ma taining transaction anonymity as the system verifies each transaction against

the user's account information. The system thus knows that user 1 purchased a loaf of

bread at a bakery that is likewise registered with the system. This system prevents

commerce between wired and non-wired individuals. That is electronic commerce is

not permitted to flow to users that are not pre-registered with the system.

Other forms of Electronic Currency are set forth in Cybercash's Lesson in Web Survival,

New York Times August 10, 1998. The article discloses a Secure Sockets Layer system

and a Digital Wallet system. In both systems, user's credit card information is

transmitted back and forth. In the Secure Socket Layer system a user provides his credit

card number which is encrypted and sent to the merchant. The merchant receives and

decrypts the information. The merchant then encrypts and sends data to the credit card

company. The credit card company opens the data and charges the user's account. In

the Digital Wallet system, the digital wallet contains all of the user's credit card numbers

and encrypts one of them. The encrypted credit card is sent to the merchant. The

merchant cannot read the credit card number but can read related transactional

information. The information is forwarded to the credit card company who decrypts

the credit card information and charges the user's account. In both of these systems,

the user's credit card information is transferred. The present invention is designed to be

used without transferring this infomration.

Moreover, all forms of electronic commerce heretofore proposed are based on a

network form of authorization, most notably the internet, that all such transactions

occur over it. Although perhaps good in intention, these systems are creating two societies, those wired with credit card accounts capable of engaging in electronic

commerce and those that are not. Any electronic commerce must be usable and

accessible by all segments of the society. It must be accessible by an inner city youth

selling newspapers just as it must be accessible to a corporate vice-president who is fullv

wired.

The present invention solves these and other problems. The present invention permits

anonymous users to receive an electronic currency substitute without first being

registered or otherwise authorized, and transfer the electronic currency without

otherwise having account information transferred therewith. A simple storage device is

also disclosed that can be used to engage in electronic commerce transactions without

being wired into a computer network, for example by our mythical newspaper sales

person.

Some of the problems to be overcome include: permitting multiple methods of currency

creation; creating freely transferable electronic currency that does not require user

identification; preventing user counterfeiting and non-user counterfeiting; and

providing a changeable standardized structure electronic currency format.

The present invention is designed to overcome these problems and provide an electronic

form of commerce that provides acceptable levels of security while at the same time

permitting anonymous electronic transfers of money substitutes. In particular, the

present invention comprises a new form of electronic money, new forms of electronic

counterfeit protection, a new storage device that may, but which does not have to be, used with this new form of electronic currency, an electronic currency generator and an

apparatus for tracking incoming cash reserves.

With these and other objectives, advantages and features of the invention that may

become apparent, the nature of the invention may be more clearly understood by

reference to the following detailed description of the invention, the appended claims,

and to the several drawings attached herein.

π. DRAWINGS

Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an Electronic Currency Unit (ECU);

Figure 2 is a flow chart for issuing ECU;

Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of ECU structure;

Figure 4 is a flow chart of ECU generation;

Figure 5 is a flow chart of ECU generation;

Figure 6 is a flow chart of ECU generation;

Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of ECU structure;

Figure 8 is a schematic diagram of ECU structure;

Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of an ECU storage device;

Figure 10 is a logic chart for ECU transactions;

Figure 11 is a schematic of an ECU issuing device; and

Figure 12 is a schematic diagram of an ECU network. ITL DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS AND OF THE

PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

A detailed description of the invention, including a description of the preferred

embodiment, is set forth below.

The present invention comprises several different products and methods that are

designed for use alone or in combination with the system described herein. Those of

ordinary skill in the art will recognize that these products may be categorized in a

number of different ways. For the purposes of this application the following categories

will be used: Electronic currency; Storage device; Transaction program; Issuing module;

Redemption module; and Network maintenance module.

A. Electronic Currency

The electronic currency unit (ECU) is the basic building block upon which other

aspects of the invention are based. Current forms of electronic currency suffer from

their inability to be used in a transaction without identifying the parties to the

transaction. The present invention solves this problem by using multiple identifiers and

encryption techniques.

ECU 1 at its most basic level may consist of a unique algorithm stored on a tangible

electronic storage medium 2, a floppy disc at its most basic. A unique algorithm

functions as a serial number and a given denomination. When the algorithm that is

generated is issued, its value is noted for redemption. Fig 2. An ECU can be issued for anything of value, including but not limited to U.S. currency, stock, bonds, or tangible

or intangible assets. Single algorithm ECU is likely to create storage problems. The

length and complexity of the algorithms that are needed will continue to increase the

more ECU is used. Although, algorithms are useful as serial number to identify each

ECU, their use as a denomination identifier can make transactions difficult. Parties have

no way of verifying that an ECU is the denomination claimed without redemption or

verification by the issuing institution.

To solve this problem a system of multiple identifiers, which may be algorithms, may be

used. A denomination identifier 3 is combined with a serial number identifier 4 . Fig.

3. Denomination identifiers may vary by issuing institution as well as by time. For

example rather than provide a currency with a numerical representation of a fixed

amount such as $20, the denomination identifier may comprise an algorithm, the length

of which may vary, that is recorded as representing $20. The ability to vary

denomination identification as a function of serial number and/or time increases

security. Denomination correlation tables, which show what amount a denomination

identifier corresponds to, may be made publicly available. Fig. 4.

If two different identifiers are used, an encryption algorithm may be applied to one or

both. The use of the term encryption refers to standard encryption as well as any

formatting of data such that only intended users have access thereto. This permits the

electronic currency to be transferred while reducing tampering or changing of the

currency. Fig 5. A duel identifier may be used for the denomination, serial number or

both. A two key type system of encryption and decryption is used, such as with a PGP

encryption scheme, the safety of the electronic currency may be increased even further.

In a two key encryption system, one key is used for encryption and one key is used for

decryption. A user can only decrypt an item that has been encrypted with the

corresponding encryption key. Access only to the encrypting key does not permit the

user to decrypt. Recipients wanting to verify some rrύnimal identifying information

about the currency may use publicly available decryption keys to gain access to portions

of the encrypted currency showing denomination information. Fig. 12 shows a public

verification method. Public verification keys are made available to user over telephone

lines or the internet. The user receives the keys and determines the currency's

authenticity. A re-encryption key may also be provided. If a re-encryption key is not

provided, only a copy of the ECU is decrypted during transaction. Fig.6.

A two-key encryption scheme also assists in preventing tampering by requiring re-

encryption after decryption. The re-encryption keys are also publicly available and may

change over time. In other words, although multiple public decryption keys may be

available to decrypt ECU, only the latest re-encryption key is available. This ensures

that all ECU that is re-encrypted is also updated in time. Older keys may be phased out

as a function of time, thus encouraging users not to hold ECU for extended periods of

time without storing in an authorized institution. Although a counterfeiter may be able

to decrypt an ECU and change the denomination, the counterfeiter is unlikely to be

able to re-encrypt the currency. Constantly changing re-encryption and decryption keys will further limit the time period during which a counterfeiter will be able to undermine

the currency substitute system and cause damage, if successful.

Multiple duel key encryption permits can also be used, a first level of denomination

information to be accessed while not providing access to the entire denomination

identifier. Two level duel key encryption permits the lowest level of security to be

publicly accessible. Users have access to the public decryption and re-encryption keys.

The second level is a secure level that is only to be accessed by the issuing and

redemption institution. A third level can also be provided. Issuing institutions may

provide designated merchants with access to a decryption and re-encryption key to

provide point of purchase verification greater than that available to the public while not

giving up ultimate access to the ECU. This merchant-level multiple duel-key

encryption form may be provided to the merchants daily, weekly or for each purchase

depending on how often the issuing institution changes encryption on new ECU being

issued.

1. Electronic Currency Header

Widespread use of ECU can be hampered by requirements for uniformity. If multiple

institutions are able to issue ECU and the users are able to freely exchange different

types of ECU, the ECU system either has to be of a uniform structure or provision for

non-uniform structures must be made. A preferred option in the ECU is the ability for different institutions to have different

ECU structure. To enable this option the ECU is provided with a header 5, a table of

contents of the ECU. A standardized header identifies, issuing institution type, the

location of information and/or the number or web address to contact for (different

levels of verification information. Additional information can also be provided.

ECU may vary from issuing institution to issuing institution so long as certain standards

are maintained. All ECU must have a value identifier and a denomination, which may

be combined or separate. Multiple denomination identifiers may be used but at the verv

least a single denomination identifier must be present. In addition, the ECU must

either contain or be operational with a basic transfer program that at the very least

copies an ECU and deletes the original copy.

Different ECU types and formats are made compatible by using a header attached to the

ECU, preferably at each level of encryption. The identification header tells the transfer

programs where the currency information is contained. For example, the first five bits

of the currency header may be used to identity where the basic denomination

information is contained, the header may then identify if any program information, such

as time dependency, devaluation ability or multi-encryption, information is contained in

the ECU and where the data is. A second header 6, encrypted within a second layer 7

of serial identifier or denomination identifiers, may contain information about that level

of data as well as the level before it. The second level header may contain selected

verification methods, such as the location and value of a string on data in the first level of data. If the data in the second header does not match that present in the first data,

tampering may be present.

Re-organizing ECU structure may be used as yet another basic verification tool or

identifier of the merchant or institution that took part in a transaction. The

organization of a given ECU may contain information as to the currency's authenticity.

For example, a known merchant may interleave denomination and serial number

identifiers using a predetermined pattern. These patterns may change over time.

2. Electronic Currency Exchange Rates

As ECU is stored on a storage medium, size of the ECU is an issue. While the level of

security for various sized denominations may change, hence changing the relative size of

the various denominations, ECU size may still become a factor hampering its everyday

use. For example, the security protection for a twenty-five cent denomination may be

relatively low. The size may still prohibit a portable holding device from carrying one

hundred dollars worth of twenty-five cent denominations. This is acceptable to most, if

not all users.

ECU size is more of an issue when change needs to be made or transmitted. One

solution to this problem is to have an exchange rate module built into the transaction

program, described in detail below. The transaction module will in effect devalue the

highest valued ECU by creating multiple identical with exchange rate /devaluation rate

information encrypted into the ECU. For example, a hundred dollar denomination may de devalued through the creation of one hundred identical denominations each

containing an encrypted exchange rate of 1/100. It should be noted that all devalued

ECUs do not have to be devalued uniformly, non-uniform devaluation is contemplated.

For most transactions this method may not be preferred as it provided the increased

encryption associated with a one hundred dollar denomination on lower denomination

values that otherwise would not be so heavily encrypted. Increased size of devalued

ECU may also be purposefully introduced to encourage timely redemption or exchange

of all devalued ECU.

It should be noted here however that the denomination algorithm might also include an

exchange rate portion for transaction between ECUs base don different currency bases.

International exchange of currency is thus easily facilitated.

3. Security Options

Although some security options have been discussed above, additional security options

for ECU are available.

Counterfeit prevention used in traditional forms of currency is hampered by time. That

is, once currency is released it may not be revoked unless a new currency is issued to

replace it. Even then unless all old forms of the currency are rendered void, a period of

overlap will exist. Old currency may always resurface. ECU solves this problem by

offering a time dependent feature. ECU may be time dependent, such that it has a life span. In its most crude form, the

encryption keys may be phased out rendering ECU useless. For example, each public

key may have a life of one month. If ECU is not decrypted and re-encrypted each

month, it becomes stale and is rendered useless.

Time dependent ECU may have a short life span of a long life span. ECU may also be

generated with a time sensitive program such that the denomination amount is varied as

a function of time. This feature provides for interest or other increases in an assets

valuation to change automatically as a function of time. x lternately, long living EVU

that correspond to stocks or any asset whose value fluctuates may constantly update the

value of the ECU base don the latest information provided to the ECU. In this case

changes in value may involve an increase in the denomination amount.

ECU may also be embedded in, or contain embedded, programs that are self-executing,

such as a time dependent computer virus. A time sensitive program can be attached to

or embedded in the ECU that limits the life of the currency, thus requiring the user to

periodically store the ECU in an authorized depository that is capable of ECU re¬

generation or re -issue. Multiple forms of time dependency may be used. The

embedded self-executing program may activate after one month has expired in

combination with public key time dependency.

Time sensitive currency may be used to force ECU back through the issuing network to

gauge its authenticity and the level of counterfeiting and ECU in circulation as a

function of assets available for redemption. The encryption of a self-destruct program or virus may also be used by issuing institutions to guard against counterfeiters.

Institution independence creates a degree of uncertainty that may be used by

institutions to periodically vary the basic construction of the ECU and prevent

counterfeiting.

In a preferred embodiment the ECU will contain three denomination identifiers and

three serial number identifiers. A first layer of two key encryption will be applied to the

first denomination and first serial number identifiers. Prior to encryption, additional

protection may be obtained by interleaving the two identifiers based on yet another

algorithm or pattern. A second denomination and serial number packet is made and

attached to the first encryption packet together with a header that identifies the second

packet information's location. The header contains a small data string and its location

in the first encrypted portion for tamper identification. A duel key encryption is applied

to this packet. A third denomination and serial number packet is made and attached to

the second encryption packet together with a header that identifies the second packet

information's location. This third packet is then encrypted using a single key

encryption. A header identifies the issuing institution and denomination information.

For basic security, a recipient uses known institutional encryption keys to de-encrypt the

ECU and verify its denomination and serial number. For transactions with pre-

registered vendors, the second encryption packet may be accessed. The duel key

encryption ensures that only authorized vendors with access to both encryption and de- encryption information access this second packet. Finally, the third packet is provided

for institutional use only. The level of encryption may be varied depending on memorv

constraints.

B. Storage devices

ECU is stored on any form of generally available storage medium, including but not

limited to ROM, RAM, DRAM, SRAM, floppy disc or hard drive. Optical storage

devices may also be used to reduce inadvertent destruction of ECU by magnetic

fluctuations. In essence, any electronic or optical storage medium may be used. If the

ECU is not on a storage medium it is in a transfer stage between two storage medium.

Storage medium may come in a variety of forms from ECU on a floppy disc, that is

physically transferred, to a portable ECU storage device to an ATM machine equipped

to receive and dispense ECU to a hard drive in the issuing institutions operation.

Network storage in accounts or depositories is perhaps the safest form of ECU storage.

Network storage may comprise, at its most a basic, a form of electronic safe deposit

boxes that are backed up and adequately protected against inadvertent destruction.

Network storage can be implemented on a user anonymous basis. Users are allocated

disk space to store their ECU. The type and amount of ECU does not need to be

determined by the storage device unless some form of disaster insurance is required or

the amount of ECU is required to be known for the transaction. Re-encryption for

time-dependent ECU can be built in. It is contemplated that the storage networks may be established to operate automatically, deducting the cost of storage direcdy from the

stored ECU. ECU monitoring can be tied in with the network storage such that the

information concerning the existing ECU pool is periodically made known, such as

amount, type, issuing institutions, etc.

Fig. 9 shows a typical storage device. The device 8 has an input port 9 that may

comprise a bus or infrared electronic transfer signal reception device. A standardized

bus is preferable provided that has both male 10 and female bus 11. This permits any

two devices to be connected simply by inverting one of the devices. A digital signal

processor 12 is connected to the BUS 9 that is in turn connected to a memory device

13 and a power supply 14. Multiple memory devices 13a & 13b may be provided all, or

some of which, may be removable. An authorization code memory or public key

memory 15, which may be connected to an input device, such as a modem or network,

is also provided in memory 13 or as a separate memory. A transaction log memory may

also be provided. A processor 16 is also provided and is connected to a digital signal

processor, memory and network devices. The device may be designed to be handheld

or it may be incorporated into an ATM machine. Devices that are in fixed locations

may benefit from dedicated connections to an authorization server that is used to

distribute ECU information.

ECU cash registers and electronic currency ATM machines likewise contain similar

storage devices. In such cases, the transaction is also tied into traditional forms of

currencv. The storage medium is thus tied into a processor, which may likewise be tied into a network through a modem etc. The network connection may be periodic or

constant depending on the transactions anticipated and the level of security required.

C. Transactions

Transactions can be carried out in a number of different ways. The level of security

required by the users will govern, at least in part, the steps that will be taken. In a basic

transaction an ECU will be transferred from one storage unit, say a hand held device, to

another. In this case, the two devices are attached. A reversible connector with male

and female connectors is ideally provided on all storage devices such that one device

may be turned upside down and connected.

The transferring machine designates the ECU to transfer though an input device. Fig.

10. A touch pad or similar input device maybe used. An execution key is then pressed.

The receiving device may be placed in the reception mode or the exact amount of ECU

being transferred may be input for additional security. The transferring device first sets

up a mutual connection with the reception device. If the mutual path is terminated or

tampered with during the transfer the transfer is cancelled. A standard communication

path is created. The transferring unit searches its memory and locates the ECU to be

transferred. This information is transmitted to the receiving device. The receiving

device copies the ECU into its memory and erases the original ECU. The transaction is

completed. Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the transfer and erase

function can be carried out bv either device or a combination of the two of them. Ideally, the receiving device will transfer the ECU into an authentication memory. The

receiving device will perform an initial analysis of the currency header to determine the

type of ECU. A search is then initiated of the receiving device's authentication memory

to determine if public decryption and re-encryption keys exist. If they do, the

authenticity of the ECU can be determined. If the authenticity does not meet a user

defined, or predetermined, threshold, the ECU is rejected. The ECU in the

authentication memory is deleted and a rejection code is transferred to the transmitting

machine. A rejection code is also stored in the receiving device. The rejection codes are

stored in a transaction log that sores information relating to identifiers, time, money

type, etc., which may be uploaded to the authentication server for processing.

If the ECU is accepted, the receiving device transmits an erase command to the

txansmitting device to delete the ECU from its memory. A log of the transaction is

generated indicating that a currency unit was transmitted and accepted. Both machines

may store this log information.

If the transferring unit is unable to identify the correct denomination in its memory, it

informs the receiving device of the need for change or devaluation. The receiving unit

searches its memory to determine if change can be provided. If a transaction is possible

the units proceed in the normal manner. After, receipt and acceptance of the

transferring unit's ECU but prior to erasing of the transferring unit's memory, the

receiving unit transmits the change. A similar verification process is performed. If both

devices accept the transaction, the original ECU is erased from both machines and the

transaction is completed. A similar process may be followed for devalued ECU or use of an exchange rate. It

should be noted that increasing value of an ECU is not permitted unless the device is an

issuing institution. Exchange rate transactions are carried out in a similar manner. Prior

to re-encryption by the receiving machine an exchange rate is inserted into the

denomination field and the header is changed accordingly. Upon acceptance of the

ECU, the transmitting machine erases the original currency'. The receiving machine

then transmits copies of the re-encrypted currency to the transmitting device according

the exchange rate and transaction amount. Both devices record the change in value in

their logs. A copy of the ECU for non-transactional purposes may also be stored and transmitted to the user network. The user network will be described in detail below.

ECU storage devices may also be provided with storage device identifier. The storage

device identifiers may be fixed or may be changed each time authentication information

is obtained. This identifier may be stored in the transaction log. The authentication

key network may download transaction log information and process it for fraudulent

activity detection. If an ECU storage device is identified as having been tampered with,

and or malfunctioning, the ECU storage device information can be transmitted to all

ECU storage devices. During initial contact between two ECU storage devices,

malfunctioning devices may be identified and the transaction terminated. This provides

yet another level of security and fraud prevention. The transaction program may also be built into an interactive TV. Alternately, an

interactive or home shopping TV program may be use din conjunction with an internet

connection or traditional telephone system to provide for ECU transactions.

D. Issuing Device

The issuing device in its most basic form may comprise a computer 17 and a storage

device 18. As those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize the computing power

necessary to generate more complex encryption may exceed that which is available to

the vast majority of home users.

An issuing institution should ideally have the following modules: serial number

generation module; denomination generation module; currency generation module; and

currency information storage module. Additional modules may include multiple

currency and generation modules; encryption modules; program selection modules;

currency re-generation modules; tracking module; multi-level authorization module;

and asset allocation module.

System security and asset allocation are the two key modules to a successful ECU

system. The issuing institution must also be able to redeem the ECU and in that regard

must safeguard the assets that it has taken in. The asset may be invested in a varietv of

commercially available instruments such that the issuing institution may generate

supplemental assets. A supplemental assets management module may be operationally

connected to the redemption and verification modules. This permits the supplemental asset management module to periodically predict the amount of funds that either will

not be redeemed or will be fraudulentiy redeemed. Asset allocation permits the

supplemental assets to be invested such that the ECU system remains viable.

Issuing institutions may use different currency generation programs so long as its ECU

is created according to a given standard. Basic denomination identifiers and transaction

routines must be standardized. The level of encryption may vary from institution to

institution. In that regard, an institution may chose to use one or multiple algorithms

for denomination verification: An issuing institution may chose to attach time sensitive

software to each ECU

E. Network

The network 19 is used to provide the public with access 23 to currency information

and encryption/decryption keys. The network is also used to collect log information.

Any time a storage device 20 contacts the network for updated information the network

may require a copy of the storage device's log.

A network monitoring module 21 can be provided that tracks currency usage, including

devaluation and rejected transactions. Rejected transactions can also be tracked based

on the reason for rejection. For example if adequate change does not exist in the ECU

pool, the issuing institutions 22 may be directed to issue multiple lower denomination

notes to new user. It should be noted that because generic public encryption keys are used, users do no_t

need to be identified when connecting their storage devices to the network. Once

updated general authentication information is available, user's can engage in

transactions anonymously without the transmission of user account information.

With time dependent ECU periodic connection of all storage devices is ensured. The

use of new re-encryption keys with the phasing out of old decryption keys will ensure

that devices that have not contacted the network in a reasonable amount of time are

forced to check in. This periodic connection provides access to a variety of information

that can be used to monitor and control the ECU trade. Devices that show a high

degree of rejected transactions or other irregular transaction practices may be

investigated.

F. Redemption

There are different levels and types of redemption. The transactions discussed above

can be though of redemption if a non-ECU is paid for the ECU. Redemption in the

context of this disclosure refers to the redemption of ECU to the issuing institution, or

its affiliates, and the transfer of non-ECU originally exchanged for the ECU to the

presenter. Redemption of ECU involves presenting a ECU to a receiving device that

has access to all decryption keys and asset reverses to pay the presenter.

When redeeming ECU a transaction similar to that discussed above may be used. The

level of authentication may vary from a full authentication to a partial authentication. The redemption devices is connected to the asset allocation module, either through as

direct connection, network or though periodic updates, to register the redemption of

ECU.

ECU that has been redeemed may be re-used, including partial or full re-encrypted.

Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize the wide commercial applicability of the

invention set forth above. Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize the large

commercial use of the electronic currency apparatuses and methods described herein to

the banking industry, to the electronic industry and to the internet commerce industry.

Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that the invention herein described and

claimed may be modified and is not limited to the specific embodiments herein

described.

Claims

We claim:

1. An electronic currency unit comprising:

a storage device comprising a header containing information on the location of a

denomination identifier and of a serial number identifier in a digital array, and a

denomination identifier and a serial number identifier coπ-esponding to said header

information.

2. An electronic currency unit as claimed in claim 1 further comprising:

a second denomination identifier and a second serial number identifier, wherein

said second denomination identifier and said second serial number identifier are

encrypted with a first encryption.

3. An electronic currency unit as claimed in claim 2 wherein said first denomination

identifier and said first serial number identifier are encrypted with a second encryption.

4. An electronic currency unit as claimed 2, wherein said first encryption is a two

key encryption method.

5. A method for issuing electronic currency comprising the steps of:

generating an electronic currency unit;

assigning said electronic currency unit a value;

recording said assigned value;

issuing said electronic currency unit.

6. The method for issuing electronic currency as claimed in claim 6 further

comprising the steps of:

encrypting at least a portion of said electronic currency unit.

7. The method for issuing electronic currency as claimed in claim 6 further

comprising the steps of:

transmitting encryption data to an electronic currency unit storage device.

8. A system for managing electronic currency comprising;

an issuing module;

a network module; and

a redemption module.

9. An electronic currency storage device comprising;

an input port;

a memory; a processor.