WO1999001815A1 - Obfuscation techniques for enhancing software security - Google Patents
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- WO1999001815A1 WO1999001815A1 PCT/US1998/012017 US9812017W WO9901815A1 WO 1999001815 A1 WO1999001815 A1 WO 1999001815A1 US 9812017 W US9812017 W US 9812017W WO 9901815 A1 WO9901815 A1 WO 9901815A1
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- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
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- G06F21/14—Protecting executable software against software analysis or reverse engineering, e.g. by obfuscation
Definitions
- the present invention relates to methods and apparatus for preventing, or at least hampering, interpretation, decoding, or reverse engineering of software. More particularly, although not exclusively, the present invention relates to methods and apparatus for increasing the structural and logical complexity of software by inserting, removing, or rearranging identifiable structure or information from the software in such a way as to exacerbate the difficulty of the process of decompilation or reverse engineering.
- TM obfuscator for Java .
- Some obfuscators target the lexical structure of the application and typically remove source code formatting and comments and rename variables.
- reverse engineering is a problem regardless of the form in which the software is distributed. Further, the problem is exacerbated when the software is distributed in hardware-independent formats that retain much or all of the information in
- Java TM bytecode and the Architecture Neutral Distribution Format (ANDF) .
- ANDF Architecture Neutral Distribution Format
- a computer implemented method for obfuscating code includes testing for completion of supplying one or more obfuscation transformations to the code, selecting a subset of the code to obfuscate, selecting an obfuscating transform to apply, applying the transformation, and returning to the completion testing step.
- the present invention relates to a method of controlling a computer so that software running on, stored on, or manipulated by the computer exhibits a predetermined and controlled degree of resistance to reverse engineering, including applying selected obfuscating transformations to selected parts of the software, in which a level of obfuscation is achieved using a selected obfuscation transformation so as to provide a required degree of resistance to reverse engineering, effectiveness in operation of the software and size of transformed software, and updating the software to reflect the obfuscating transformations.
- the present invention provides a computer implemented method for enhancing software security, including identifying one or more source code input files corresponding to the source software for the application to be processed, selecting a required level of obfuscation (e.g., potency), selecting a maximum execution time or space penalty (e.g., cost), reading and parsing the input files, optionally along with any library or supplemental files read directly or indirectly by the source code, providing information identifying data types, data structures, and control structures used by the application to be processed, and constructing appropriate tables to store this information, preprocessing information about the application, in response to the preprocessing step, selecting and applying obfuscating code transformations to source code objects, repeating the obfuscating code transformation step until the required potency has been achieved or the maximum cost has been exceeded, and outputting the transformed software.
- a required level of obfuscation e.g., potency
- a maximum execution time or space penalty e.g., cost
- the information about the application is obtained using various static analysis techniques and dynamic analysis techniques.
- the static analysis techniques include inter-procedural dataflow analysis and data dependence analysis.
- the dynamic analysis techniques include profiling, and optionally, information can be obtained via a user.
- Profiling can be used to determine the level of obfuscation, which can be applied to a particular source code object. Transformations can include control transformations created using opaque constructs in which an opaque construct is any mathematical object that is inexpensive to execute from a performance standpoint, simple for an obfuscator to construct, and expensive for a deobfuscator to break.
- opaque constructs can be constructed using aliasing and concurrency techniques .
- Information about the source application can also be obtained using pragmatic analysis, which determines the nature of language constructs and programming idioms the application contains.
- the potency of an obfuscation transformation can be evaluated using software complexity metrics.
- Obfuscation code transformations can be applied to any language constructs: for example, modules, classes, or subroutines can be split or merged; new control and data structures can be created; and original control and data structures can be modified.
- the new constructs added to the transformed application are selected to be as similar as possible to those in the source application, based on the pragmatic information gathered during preprocessing.
- the method can produce subsidiary files including information about which obfuscating transformations have been applied and information relating obfuscated code of the transformed application to the source software.
- the obfuscation transformations are selected to preserve the observable behavior of the software such that if P is the untransformed software, and P' is the transformed software, P and P' have the same observable behavior. More particularly, if P fails to terminate or terminates with an error condition, then P' may or may not terminate, otherwise P' terminates and produce the same output as P.
- Observable behavior includes effects experienced by a user, but P and P' may run with different detailed behavior unobservable by a user.
- detailed behavior of P and P' that can be different includes file creation, memory usage, and network communication.
- the present invention also provides a deobfuscating tool adopted to remove obfuscations from an obfuscated application by use of slicing, partial evaluation, dataflow analysis, or statistical analysis.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a data processing system in accordance with the teachings of the present invention
- FIG. 2 illustrates a classification of software protection including categories of obfuscating transformations
- FIGs. 3a and 3b show techniques for providing software security by (a) server-side execution and (b) partial server-side execution;
- FIGs. 4a and 4b show techniques for providing software security by (a) using encryption and (b) using signed native code
- FIG. 5 shows a technique for providing software security through obfuscation
- FIG. 6 illustrates the architecture of an example of an obfuscating tool suitable for use with Java applications
- FIG. 7 is a table that tabulates a selection of known software complexity metrics
- FIGs. 8a and 8b illustrate the resilience of an obfuscating transformation
- FIG. 9 shows different types of opaque predicates
- FIGs. 10a and 10b provide examples of (a) trivial opaque constructs and (b) weak opaque constructs;
- FIG. 11 illustrates an example of a computation transformation (branch insertion transformation)
- FIGs. 12a through 12d illustrate a loop condition insertion transformation
- FIG. 13 illustrates a transformation that transforms reducible flowgraphs into non-reducible flowgraphs
- FIG. 14 shows that a section of code can be parallelized if it contains no data dependencies
- FIG. 15 shows that a section of code that contains no data dependencies can be split into concurrent threads by inserting appropriate synchronization primitives
- FIG. 16 shows how procedures P and Q are inlined at their call-sites and then removed from the code
- FIG. 17 illustrates inlining method calls
- FIG. 18 shows a technique for interleaving two methods declared in the same class
- FIG. 19 shows a technique for creating several different versions of a method by applying different sets of obfuscating transformations to the original code ;
- FIGs. 20a through 20c provide examples of loop transformations including (a) loop blocking, (b) loop unrolling, and (c) loop fission;
- FIG. 21 shows a variable splitting example
- FIG. 22 provides a function constructed to obfuscate strings "AAA” , "BAAAA” , and "CCB” ;
- FIG. 23 shows an example merging two 32-bit variables x and y into one 64 -bit variable Z;
- FIG. 24 illustrates an example of a data transformation for array restructuring;
- FIG. 25 illustrates modifications of an inheritance hierarchy
- FIG. 26 illustrates opaque predicates constructed from objects and aliases
- FIG. 27 provides an example of opaque constructs using threads
- FIGs. 28a through 28d illustrate obfuscation vs. deobfuscation in which (a) shows an original program including three statements, S 1-3 , being obfuscated, (b) shows a deobfuscator identifying "constant" opaque predicates, (c) shows the deobfuscator determining the common code in the statements, and (d) shows the deobfuscator applying some final simplifications and returning the program to its original form;
- FIG. 29 shows an architecture of a Java TM deobfuscation tool
- FIG. 30 shows an example of statistical analysis used for evaluation
- FIGs. 31a and 31b provide tables of an overview of various obfuscating transforms
- FIG. 32 provides an overview of various opaque constructs .
- Java TM obfuscation tool which is currently being developed by the applicants.
- present techniques are applicable to other programming languages and the invention is not to be construed as restricted to Java applications.
- implementation of the present invention in the context of other programming languages is considered to be within the purview of one of ordinary skill in the art.
- the exemplary embodiment that follows is, for clarity, specifically targeted at a Java TM obfuscating tool.
- P is the input application to be obfuscated; P' is the transformed application; T is a transformation such that T transforms P into P' .
- P(T)P' is an obfuscating transformation if P and P' have the same observable behavior. Observable behavior is defined generally as behavior experienced by the user. Thus, P' may have side effects such as creating files that P does not, so long as these side effects are not experienced by the user. P and P' do not need to be equally efficient.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a data processing system in accordance with the teachings of the present invention.
- FIG. 1 shows a computer 100, which includes three major elements.
- Computer 100 includes an input/output (I/O) circuit 120, which is used to communicate information in appropriately structured form to and from other portions of computer 100.
- Computer 100 includes a control processing unit (CPU) 130 in communication with I/O circuit 120 and a memory 140 (e.g., volatile and non-volatile memory) .
- CPU control processing unit
- memory 140 e.g., volatile and non-volatile memory
- a raster display monitor 160 is shown in communication with I/O circuit 120 and issued to display images generated by CPU 130.
- CRT cathode ray tube
- a conventional keyboard 150 is also shown in communication with I/O 120.
- computer 100 can be part of a larger system.
- computer 100 can also be in communication with a network (e.g., connected to a local area network (LAN) ) .
- LAN local area network
- computer 100 can include obfuscating circuitry for enhancing software security in accordance with the teachings of the present invention, or as will be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art, the present invention can be implemented in software executed by computer 100 (e.g., the software can be stored in memory 140 and executed on CPU 130) .
- an unobfuscated program P (e.g., an application), stored in memory 140, can be obfuscated by an obfuscator executing on CPU 130 to provide an obfuscated program P' , stored in memory 140, in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 shows the architecture of a Java TM obfuscator.
- Java application class files are passed along with any library files.
- An inheritance tree is constructed as well as a symbol table, providing type information for all symbols and control flow graphs for all methods.
- the user may optionally provide profiling data files as generated by Java TM profiling tools.
- This informati•on can be used to guide the obfuscator to ensure that frequently executed parts of the application are not obfuscated by very expensive transformations.
- Information is gathered about the application using standard compiler techniques such as interprocedural dataflow analysis and data dependence analysis. Some can be provided by the user and some by specialized techniques. The information is used to select and apply the appropriate code transformations.
- Appropriate transformations are selected.
- the governing criteria used in selecting the most suitable transformation include the requirement that the chosen transformation blend in naturally with the rest of the code. This can be dealt with by favoring transformations with a high appropriateness value. A further requirement is that transformations which yield a high level of obfuscation with low execution time penalty should be favored. This latter point is accomplished by selecting transformations that maximize potency and resilience, and minimize cost.
- An obfuscation priority is allocated to a source code object. This will reflect how important it is to obfuscate the contents of the source code object. For example, if a particular source code object contains highly sensitive proprietary material, then the obfuscation priority will be high.
- An execution time rank is determined for each method, which equals 1 if more time is spent executing the method than any other.
- the application is then obfuscated by building the appropriate internal data structures, the mapping from each source code object to the appropriate transformation, the obfuscation priority, and the execution time rank. The obfuscating transformations are applied until the required level of obfuscation has been achieved or until the maximum execution time penalty is exceeded. The transformed application is then written.
- the output of the obfuscation tool is a new application that is functionally equivalent to the original .
- the tool can also produce Java TM source files annotated with information about which transformations have been applied and how the obfuscated code relates to the original application.
- Obfuscating transformations can be evaluated and classified according to their quality.
- the quality of a transformation can be expressed according to its potency, resilience, and cost.
- the potency of a transformation is related to how obscure P' is in relation to P. Any such metric will be relatively vague as it necessarily depends on human cognitive abilities. For the present purposes it is sufficient to consider the potency of a transformation as a measure of the usefulness of the transformation.
- the resilience of a transformation measures how well a transformation holds up to an attack from an automatic deobfuscator. This is a combination of two factors: programmer effort and deobfuscator effort. Resilience can be measured on a scale from trivial to one-way. One-way transformations are extreme in that they cannot be reversed.
- the third component is transformation execution cost. This is the execution time or space penalty incurred as a result of using the transformed application P' . Further details of transformation evaluation are discussed below in the detailed description of the preferred embodiments.
- the main classification of obfuscating transformations is shown in FIG. 2c with details given in FIGs. 2e through 2g.
- Obfuscating transforms may be categorized as follows: control obfuscation, data obfuscations , layout obfuscations, and preventive obfuscations. Some examples of these are discussed below.
- Control obfuscations include aggregation transformations, ordering transformations, and computation transformations.
- Computation transformations include: concealing real control flow behind irrelevant non-unctional statements; introducing code sequences at the object code level for which there exist no corresponding high- level language constructs; and removing real control flow abstractions or introducing spurious ones.
- the P ⁇ predicate is irrelevant code, because it will always evaluate to True.
- S is again broken into two halves, which are transformed into two different obfuscated versions S a and S . Therefore, it will not be obvious to a reverse engineer that S a and S perform the same function.
- FIG. lie is similar to FIG. lib, however, a bug is introduced into Sb .
- the PT predicate always selects the correct version of the code, S a .
- Another type of obfuscation transformation is a data transformation.
- An example of a data transformation is deconstructing arrays to increase the complexity of code.
- An array can be split into several subarrays, two or more arrays can be merged into a single array, or the dimensions of an array can be increased (flattening) or decreased (folding) .
- FIG. 24 illustrates a number of examples of array transformations.
- an array A is split into two subarrays Al and A2.
- Al contains elements with even indices and A2 contains elements with odd indices.
- Statements (3-4) illustrate how two integer arrays B and C can be interleaved to produce an array BC. The elements from B and C are evenly spread throughout the transformed array.
- Statements (6-7) illustrate folding of array D into array Dl .
- Such transformations introduce previously absent data structure or remove existing data structure. This can greatly increase the obscurity of the program as, for example, in declaring a 2 -dimensional array a programmer usually does so for a purpose, with the chosen structure mapping onto the corresponding data. If that array is folded into a 1-d structure, a reverse engineer would be deprived of valuable pragmatic information.
- Another example of an obfuscating transformation is a preventive transformation.
- preventive transformations In contrast to control or data transformations, the main goal of preventive transformations is not to obscure the program to a human reader, but to make known automatic deobfuscation techniques more difficult or to exploit known problems in current deobfuscators or decompilers . Such transformations are known as inherent and targeted, respectively.
- An example of an inherent preventive transformation is reordering a for-loop to run backward. Such reordering is possible if the loop has no loop-carried data dependencies. A deobfuscator could perform the same analysis and reorder the loop to forward execution. However, if a bogus data dependency is added to the reversed loop, the identification of the loop and its reordering would be prevented.
- the obfuscator is based on the application of code transformations, in many cases similar to those used by compiler optimizers. We describe a large number of such transformations, classify them, and evaluate them with respect to their potency (e.g., To what degree is a human reader confused?), resilience (e.g., How well are automatic deobfuscation attacks resisted?) , and cost (e.g., How much performance overhead is added to the application?) .
- Java bytecode and the Architecture Neutral Distribution Format (ANDF) .
- Java applications in particular pose a problem to software developers . They are distributed over the Internet as Java class files, a hardware-independent virtual machine code that retains virtually all the information of the original Java source. Hence, these class files are easy to decompile. Moreover, because much of the computation takes place in standard libraries, Java programs are often small in size and therefore relatively easy to reverse engineer.
- FIG. 2 An overview of various forms of protection for providing legal protection or security for software is provided in FIG. 2.
- FIG. 2 An overview of various forms of protection for providing legal protection or security for software is provided in FIG. 2.
- Section 2 we give an overview of different forms of technical protection against software theft and argue that code obfuscation currently affords the most economical prevention.
- Section 3 we give a brief overview of the design of Kava, a code obfuscator for Java, which is currently under construction.
- Sections 4 and 5 describe the criteria we use to classify and evaluate different types of obfuscating transformations.
- Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 present a catalogue of obfuscating transformations.
- Section 10 we give more detailed obfuscation algorithms.
- Section 11 we conclude with a summary of our results and a discussion of future directions of code obfuscation.
- the most secure approach is for Alice not to sell her application at all, but rather sell its services. In other words, users never gain access to the application itself but rather connect to Alice's site to run the program remotely as shown in FIG. 3a, paying a small amount of electronic money every time.
- the advantage to Alice is that Bob will never gain physical access to the application and hence will not be able to reverse engineer it.
- the downside is of course that, due to limits on network bandwidth and latency, the application may perform much worse than if it had run locally on the user's site.
- a partial solution is to break the application into two parts: a public part that runs locally on the user's site, and a private part (that contains the algorithms that Alice wants to protect) that is run remotely, for example, as shown in FIG. 3b.
- the JavaTM programming language has gained popularity mainly because of its architecture neutral bytecode. While this clearly facilitates mobile code, it does decrease the performance by an order of magnitude in comparison to native code. Predictably, this has lead to the development of just-in-time compilers that translate Java bytecodes to native code on-the-fly. Alice could make use of such translators to create native code versions of her application for all popular architectures. When downloading the application, the user's site would have to identify the architecture/operating system combination it is running, and the corresponding version would be transmitted, for example, as shown in FIG. 4b. Only having access to the native code will make Bob's task more difficult, although not impossible. There is a further complication with transmitting native code.
- code obfuscation can never completely protect an application from malicious reverse engineering efforts. Given enough time and determination, Bob will always be able to dissect Alice's application to retrieve its important algorithms and data structures. To aid this effort, Bob may try to run the obfuscated code through an automatic deobfuscator that attempts to undo the obfuscating transformations .
- the level of security from reverse engineering that an obfuscator adds to an application depends on, for example, (a) the sophistication of the transformations employed by the obfuscator, (b) the power of the available deobfuscation algorithms, and (c) the amount of resources (time and space) available to the deobfuscator.
- FIG. 6 shows an architecture of Kava, the Java obfuscator.
- the main input to the tool is a set of Java class files and the obfuscation level required by the user.
- the user may optionally provide files of profiling data, as generated by Java profiling tools. This information can be used to guide the obfuscator to make sure that frequently executed parts of the application are not obfuscated by very expensive transformations.
- Input to the tool is a Java application, given as a set of Java class files.
- the user also selects the required level of obfuscation (e.g., potency) and the maximum execution time/space penalty that the obfuscator is allowed to add to the application (the cost) .
- Kava reads and parses the class files along with any library files referenced directly or indirectly. A complete inheritance tree is constructed, as well as a symbol table giving type information for all symbols, and control flow graphs for all methods. Kava contains a large pool of code transformations, which are described below. Before these can be applied, however, a preprocessing pass collects various types of information about the application in accordance with one embodiment . Some kinds of information can be gathered using standard compiler techniques such as inter-procedural dataflow analysis and data dependence analysis, some can be provided by the user, and some are gathered using specialized techniques. Pragmatic analysis, for example, analyzes the application to see what sort of language constructs and programming idioms it contains .
- the information gathered during the preprocessing pass is used to select and apply appropriate code transformations.
- All types of language constructs in the application can be the subject of obfuscation: for example, classes can be split or merged, methods can be changed or created, new control and data structures can be created and original ones modified. New constructs added to the application can be selected to be as similar as possible to the ones in the source application, based on the pragmatic information gathered during the preprocessing pass .
- the transformation process is repeated until the required potency has been achieved or the maximum cost has been exceeded.
- the output of the tool is a new application -- functionally equivalent to the original one -- normally given as a set of Java class files.
- the tool will also be able to produce Java source files annotated with information about which transformations have been applied, and how the obfuscated code relates to the original source. The annotated source will be useful for debugging.
- P' may or may not terminate .
- FIG. 2c The main dividing line between different classes of obfuscation techniques is shown in FIG. 2c.
- FIG. 7 is a table that tabulates some of the more popular complexity measures, in which E (x) is the complexity of a software component x, F is a function or method, C is a class, and P is a program.
- E (x) is the complexity of a software component x
- F is a function or method
- C is a class
- P is a program.
- the complexity metrics allow us to formalize the concept of potency and will be used below as a measure of the usefulness of a transformation.
- a transformation is potent if it does a good job confusing Bob, by hiding the intent of Alice's original code.
- the potency of a transformation measures how much more difficult the obfuscated code is to understand (for a human) than the original code. This is formalized in the following definition:
- T Transformation Potency
- P a behavior-conserving transformation
- P the complexity of P
- T is a potent obfuscating transformation if T pot (P) > 0.
- SI SI; SI;
- Deobfuscator Effort the execution time and space required by such an automatic deobfuscator to effectively reduce the potency of T .
- a transformation is potent if it manages to confuse a human reader, but it is resilient if it confuses an automatic deobfuscator.
- FIG. 8b shows that deobfuscator effort is classified as either polynomial time or exponential time.
- Programmer effort the work required to automate the deobfuscation of a transformation T, is measured as a function of the scope of T. This is based on the intuition that i't is easier to construct counter-measures against an obfuscating transformation that only affects a small part of a procedure, than against one that may affect an entire program.
- T is a local transformation if it affects a single basic block of a control flow graph (CFG) , it is global if it affects an entire CFG, it is inter-procedural if it affects the flow of information between procedures, and it is an interprocess transformation if it affects the interaction between independently executing threads of control .
- CFG control flow graph
- T transformation Resilience
- T res (P) is the resilience of T with respect to a program P.
- ⁇ res ( p ) i a one-way transformation if information is removed from P such that P cannot be reconstructed from P' .
- l r es resil ience ( iDeobfusoator effort ' •' ⁇ Programmer effort ) ' in which Resilience is the function defined in the matrix in FIG. 8b.
- the first transformation removes the source code formatting information sometimes available in Java class files. This is a one-way transformation, because once the original formatting is gone it cannot be recovered; it is a transformation with low potency, because there is very little semantic content in formatting, and no great confusion is introduced when that information is removed; finally, this is a free transformation, because the space and time complexity of the application is not affected. Scrambling identifier names is also a one-way and free transformation. However, it has a much higher potency than formatting removal, because identifiers contain a great deal of pragmatic information.
- Computation transformations can insert new (redundant or dead) code, or make algorithmic changes to the source application. For transformations that alter the flow of control, a certain amount of computational overhead will be unavoidable. For Alice this means that she may have to choose between a highly efficient program, and one that is highly obfuscated. An obfuscator can assist her in this trade-off by allowing her to choose between cheap and expensive transformations.
- V is opaque at a point p in a program, if V has a property q at p, which is known at obfuscation time. We write this as V q p or V q if p is clear from the context.
- a predicate P is opaque at p if its outcome is known at obfuscation time. We write P p (P ⁇ p ) if P always evaluates to False (True) at p, and P ' p if P sometimes evaluates to True and sometimes to False. Again, p will be omitted if clear from the context.
- FIG. 9 shows different types of opaque predicates.
- Solid lines indicate paths that may sometimes be taken, and dashed lines indicate paths that will never be taken.
- Section 8 provides examples of opaque constructs with much higher resilience.
- FIGs. 10a and 10b provide examples of (a) trivial opaque constructs and (b) weak opaque constructs .
- An opaque construct is weak if a deobfuscator can crack it by a static global analysis.
- An analysis is global if it is restricted to a single control flow graph.
- Computation Transformations fall into three categories: hide the real control-flow behind irrelevant statements that do not contribute to the actual computations, introduce code sequences at the object code level for which there exist no corresponding high-level language constructs, or remove real control-flow abstractions or introduce spurious ones .
- FIG. 12 shows how we can obfuscate a loop by making the termination condition more complex.
- the basic idea is to extend the loop condition with a P or P predicate that will not affect the number of times the loop will execute.
- a programming language is compiled to a native or virtual machine code, which is more expressive than the language itself.
- a transformation is language-breaking if it introduces virtual machine (or native code) instruction sequences that have no direct correspondence with any source language construct.
- a deobfuscator will either have to try to synthesize an equivalent (but convoluted) source language program or give up altogether.
- the JavaTM bytecode has a goto instruction, but the JavaTM language has no corresponding goto statement.
- the control flow graphs produced from JavaTM programs will always be reducible, but the JavaTM bytecode can express non-reducible flow graphs .
- JavaTM decompiler would have to turn a non-reducible flow graph into one which either duplicates code or which contains extraneous
- Boolean variables could guess that all non-reducible flow graphs have been produced by an obfuscator, and simply remove the opaque predicate. To counter this we can sometimes use the alternative transformation shown in FIG 13b. If a deobfuscator blindly removes P , the resulting code will be incorrect.
- FIGs. 13a and 13b illustrate a transformation for transforming a Reducible flow graph to a Non-Reducible Flow graph.
- FIG. 13a we split the loop body S2 into two parts (S a 2 and S 2 ) , ahd insert a bogus jump to the beginning of S 2 .
- FIG. 13b we also break SI into two parts, S a x and S 1 .
- S -,_ is moved into the loop and an opaque predicate P ensures that S 1 is always executed before the loop body.
- a second predicate Q Fensures that S ! is only executed once.
- the obfuscator will be able to counter this by simply providing its own versions of the standard libraries. For example, calls to the Java Dictionary class (which uses a hash table implementation) could be turned into calls to a class with identical behavior, but implemented as, for example, a red-black tree. The cost of this transformation is not so much in execution time, but in the size of the program.
- a section of code can be easily parallelized if it contains no data dependencies. For example, if S ⁇ and S 2 are two data-independent statements they can be run in parallel.
- programs can be parallelized using calls to thread (lightweight process) libraries.
- thread lightweight process
- FIG. 15 a section of code that contains data dependencies can be split into concurrent threads by inserting appropriate synchronization primitives, such as await and advance (see Michael Wolfe. High Performance Compilers For Parallel Computing. Addison-Wesley, 1996. ISBN 0-8053-2730-4, incorporated herein by reference) .
- Such a program will essentially be running sequentially, but the flow of control will be shifting from one thread to the next.
- Inlining is, of course, a important compiler optimization. It is also an extremely useful obfuscation transformation, because it removes procedural abstractions from the program. Inlining is a highly resilient transformation (it is essentially one-way) , because once a procedure call has been replaced with the body of the called procedure and the procedure itself has been removed, there is no trace of the abstraction left in the code.
- FIG. 16 shows how procedures P and Q are inlined at their call-sites, and then removed from the code .
- Outlining turning a sequence of statements into a subroutine
- We create a bogus procedural abstraction by extracting the beginning of Q's code and the end of P's code into a new procedure R.
- inlining may, in fact, not always be a fully one-way transformation.
- m.P() a method invocation m.P().
- the actual procedure called will depend on the run-time type of m.
- we inline all possible methods (see Jeffrey Dean. Whole-Program Optimization of Object-Oriented Languages. PhD thesis, University of Washington, 1996, incorporated herein by reference) and select the appropriate code by branching on the type of m) .
- the obfuscated code may still contain some traces of the original abstractions.
- FIG. 17 illustrates inlining method calls. Unless we can statically determine the type of m, all possible methods to which m.P() could be bound must be inlined at the call site.
- FIG. 18 shows how we can interleave two methods declared in the same class. The idea is to merge the bodies and parameter lists of the methods and add an extra parameter (or global variable) to discriminate between calls to the individual methods. Ideally, the methods should be similar in nature to allow merging of common code and parameters. This is the case in FIG. 18, in which the first parameter of Ml and M2 have the same type .
- FIG. 19 shows how we can create several different versions of a method by applying different sets of obfuscating transformations to the original code.
- Method dispatch to select between the different versions at runtime.
- Method cloning is similar to the predicate insertion transformations in FIG. 11, except that here we are using method dispatch rather than opaque predicates to select between different versions of the code.
- Loop Blocking is used to improve the cache behavior of a loop by breaking up the iteration space so that the inner loop fits in the cache.
- Loop unrolling as shown in FIG. 20b, replicates the body of a loop one or more times. If the loop bounds are known at compile time the loop can be unrolled in its entirety.
- Loop fission as shown in FIG. 20c, turns a loop with a compound body into several loops with the same iteration space.
- Ordering transformations can be particularly useful companions to the "Inline-Outline" transformation of Section 6.3.1.
- the potency of that transformation can be enhanced by (1) inlining several procedure calls in a procedure P, (2) randomizing the order of the statements in P, and (3) outlining contiguous sections of P's statements. This way, unrelated statements that were previously part of several different procedures are brought together into bogus procedural abstractions.
- loop reversal transformations are common in high-performance compilers (David F. Bacon, Susan L. Graham, and Oliver J. Sharp. Compiler transformations for high-performance computing. ACM Computing Surveys, 26 (4) : 345--420, December 1994. http:// www.acm.org/pubs/toc/Abstracts/0360-0300/ 197406.html.) .
- Obfuscating storage transformations attempt to choose unnatural storage classes for dynamic as well as static data. Similarly, encoding transformations attempt to choose unnatural encodings for common data types . Storage and encoding transformations often go hand- in-hand, but they can sometimes be used in isolation.
- This transformation increases the u 5 metric, because the number of global data structures referenced by P and Q is increased.
- Boolean variables and other variables of restricted range can be split into two or more variables.
- 21a shows a possible choice of representation for split Boolean variables.
- a technique for obfuscating a static string is to convert it into a program that produces the string.
- the program -- which could be a DFA or a Trie traversal -- could possibly produce other strings as well .
- a function G of FIG. 22 which is constructed to obfuscate the strings ''AAA'', ''BAAAA'', and ' ' CCB ' ' .
- G may or may not terminate.
- object-oriented languages are more data-oriented than control-oriented.
- control is organized around the data structures, rather than the other way around. This means that an important part of reverse-engineering an object-oriented application is trying to restore the program's data structures. Conversely, it is important for an obfuscator to try to hide these data structures .
- Two or more scalar variables V 1 . . . V k can be merged into one variable V M , provided the combined ranges of V x . . . V k will fit within the precision of V M .
- two 32-bit integer variables could be merged into one 64 -bit variable.
- Arithmetic on the individual variables would be transformed into arithmetic on V M .
- V M As a simple example, consider merging two 32 -bit integer variables X and Y into a 64 -bit variable Z. Using the merging formula,
- FIG. 23 shows merging two
- FIG. 23a gives rules for addition and multiplication with X and Y.
- V-_ . . . V k are object reference variables, for example, then the element type of VA can be any class that is higher in the inheritance hierarchy than any of the types of
- V, . . . V k V, . . . V k .
- a number of transformations can be devised for obscuring operations performed on arrays: for example, we can split an array into several sub-arrays, merge two or more arrays into one array, fold an array (increasing the number of dimensions) , or flatten an array (decreasing the number of dimensions) .
- FIG. 24 shows some examples of array restructuring.
- an array A is split up into two sub-arrays Al and A2.
- Al holds the elements of A that have even indices
- A2 holds the elements with odd indices.
- Statements (3-4) of FIG. 24 show how two integer arrays B and C can be interleaved into a resulting array BC. The elements from B and C are evenly spread over the resulting array. Statements (6-7) demonstrate how a one-dimensional array D can be folded into a two- dimensional array Dl . Statements (8-9), finally, demonstrate the reverse transformation: a two- dimensional array E is flattened into a one-dimensional array El.
- Array splitting and folding increase the u 6 data complexity metric .
- Array merging and flattening seem to decrease this measure. While this may seem to indicate that these transformations have only marginal or even negative potency, this, in fact, is deceptive.
- the problem is that the complexity metrics of FIG. 7 fail to capture an important aspect of some data structure transformations : they introduce structure where there was originally none or they remove structure from the original program. This can greatly increase the obscurity of the program. For example, a programmer who declares a two-dimensional array does so for a purpose: the chosen structure somehow maps cleanly to the data that is being manipulated. If that array is folded into a one-dimensional structure, a reverse engineer will have been deprived of much valuable pragmatic information.
- Classes are essentially abstract data types that encapsulate data (instance variables) and control (methods) .
- C (V, M)
- V is the set of C's instance variables and M its methods.
- C 1 and C 2 can be composed by aggregation (C 2 has an instance variable of type C x ) as well as by inheritance (C 2 extends C- L by adding new methods and instance variables) .
- C 2 C- L U C' 2 .
- C 2 is said to inherit from C lf its super- or parent class.
- the U operator is the function that combines the parent class with the new properties defined in C' 2 .
- the exact semantics of U depends on the particular programming language. In languages such as Java, U is usually interpreted as union when applied to the instance variables and as overriding when applied to methods.
- the complexity of a class C grows with its depth (distance from the root) in the inheritance hierarchy and the number of its direct descendants. For example, there are two basic ways in which we can increase this complexity: we can split up (factor) a class as shown in FIG. 25a or insert a new, bogus, class as shown in FIG. 25b.
- a problem with class factoring is its low resilience; there is nothing stopping a deobfuscator from simply merging the factored classes. To prevent this, factoring and insertion are normally combined as shown in FIG. 25d.
- FIG. 25c shows a variant of class insertion, called false refactoring. Refactoring is a
- Refactoring is a two-step process. First, it is detected that two, apparently independent classes, in fact implement similar behavior.
- predicates are the major building block in the design of transformations that obfuscate control flow. In fact, the quality of most control transformations is directly dependent on the quality of such predicates .
- Section 6.1 we gave examples of simple opaque predicates with trivial and weak resilience. This means that the opaque predicates can be broken (an automatic deobfuscator could determine their value) using local or global static analysis. Obviously, we generally require a much higher resistance to attack. Ideally, we would like to be able to construct opaque predicates that require worst case exponential time (in the size of the program) to break but only polynomial time to construct. In this section we will present two such techniques . The first one is based on aliasing and the second is based on lightweight processes.
- Parallel programs are more difficult to analyze statically than their sequential counterparts. The reason is their interleaving semantics: n statements in a parallel region PAR S l t S 2, . . ., S n , ENDPAR can be executed in n! different ways. In spite of this, some static analyses over parallel programs can be performed in polynomial time [18] , while others require all n! interleavings to be considered.
- parallel regions are constructed using lightweight processes known as threads. Java threads have (from our point of view) two very useful properties: (1) their scheduling policy is not specified strictly by the language specification and will hence depend on the implementation, and (2) the actual scheduling of a thread will depend on asynchronous events, such as generated by user interaction, and network traffic. Combined with the inherent interleaving semantics of parallel regions, this means that threads are very difficult to analyze statically.
- V can be a dynamic data structure such as the one created in FIG. 26.
- the threads would randomly move the global pointers g and h around in their respective components, by asynchronously executing calls to move and insert.
- This has the advantage of combining data races with interleaving and aliasing effects, for very high degrees of resilience.
- FIG. 27 we illustrate these ideas with a much simpler example where V is a pair of global integer variables X and Y. It is based on the well-known fact from elementary number theory that, for any integers x and y, 7y -1 does not equal x . 9 Deobfuscation and Preventive Transformations
- the opaque predicate is the main device the obfuscator has at its disposal to prevent the bogus inner program from being easily identified and removed.
- an obfuscator embeds bogus code protected by opaque predicates within three statements of a real program.
- a deobfuscator ' s task is to examine the obfuscated application and automatically identify and remove the inner bogus program. To accomplish this, the deobfuscator must first identify and then evaluate opaque constructs . This process is illustrated in FIGs.28b through 28d.
- FIG. 29 shows the anatomy of a semi-automatic deobfuscation tool . It incorporates a number of techniques that are well known in the reverse engineering community. In the remainder of this section we will briefly review some of these techniques and discuss various counter-measures (so called preventive transformations) that an obfuscator can employ to make deobfuscation more difficult.
- Preventive transformations which are discussed above with respect to FIG. 2g, are quite different in flavor from control or data transformations. In contrast to these, their main goal is not to obscure the program to a human reader. Rather, they are designed to make known automatic deobfuscation techniques more difficult (inherent preventive transformations) , or to explore known problems in current deobfuscators or decompilers (targeted preventive transformations) .
- Inherent preventive transformations will generally have low potency and high resilience. Most importantly, they will have the ability to boost the resilience of other transformations. As an example, assume that we have reordered a for-loop to run backwards, as suggested in section 6.4. We were able to apply this transformation only because we could determine that the loop had no loop-carried data dependencies. Naturally, there is nothing stopping a deobfuscator from performing the same analysis and then returning the loop to forward execution. To prevent this, we can add a bogus data dependency to the reversed loop:
- HoseMocha program Mark D. LaDue . HoseMocha. http : //www.xynyx. demon.nl/java/HoseMocha.java, January 1997). It was designed specifically to explore a weakness in the Mocha (Hans Peter Van Vliet. Mocha The
- a deobfuscator can use knowledge of the strategies employed by known obfuscators to identify opaque predicates.
- the obfuscator should avoid using canned opaque constructs . It is also important to choose opaque constructs that are syntactically similar to the constructs used in the real application.
- a programmer will generally find the obfuscated version of a program more difficult to understand and reverse engineer than the original one. The main reasons are that in the obfuscated program (a) live "real" code will be interspersed with dead bogus code, and (b) logically related pieces of code will have been broken up and dispersed over the program.
- Program slicing tools can be used by a reverse engineer to counter these obfuscations. Such tools can interactively aid the engineer to decompose a program into manageable chunks called slices.
- a slice of a program P with respect to a point p and a variable v consists of all the statements of P that could have contributed to v's value at p.
- a program slicer would be able to extract from the obfuscated program the statements of the algorithm that computes an opaque variable v, even if the obfuscator has dispersed these statements over the entire program.
- a parameter alias is two formal parameters (or a formal parameter and a global variable) that refer to the same memory location.
- the cost of precise inter-procedural slicing grows with the number of potential aliases in a program, which in turn grows exponentially with the number of formal parameters.
- the obfuscator adds aliased dummy parameters to a program it will either substantially slow down the slicer (if precise slices are required) , or force the slicer to produce imprecise slices (if fast slicing is required) .
- a deobfuscator can instrument an obfuscated program to analyze the outcome of all predicates.
- the deobfuscator would alert the reverse engineer to any predicate that always returns the same truth value over a large number of test runs, because they may turn out to be an opaque P (P ) predicate.
- P opaque P
- the deobfuscator could not blindly replace such predicates with True (False) , because this would be too dangerous.
- the obfuscator may choose to favor transformations that insert P ' predicates (such as the one shown in FIG. lib) over those that insert P or P predicates.
- Another possible counter-measure against statistical analysis is to design opaque predicates in such a way that several predicates have to be cracked at the same time.
- One way of doing this is to let the opaque predicates have side-effects.
- the obfuscator has determined (through some sort of static flow analysis) that statements S ⁇ and S 2 must always execute the same number of times .
- the statements are obfuscated by introducing opaque predicates which are calls to functions Q x and Q 1 .
- Q ⁇ and Q 2 increment and decrement a global variable k:
- Deobfuscation is similar to many types of code optimization. Removing if (False) . . . is dead code elimination and moving identical code from if-statement branches (e.g., S x and S 0 in FIG. 28) is code hoisting, both common code optimization techniques.
- Deobfuscation also resembles partial evaluation.
- a partial evaluator splits a program into two parts: the static part which can be precomputed by the partial evaluator, and the dynamic part which is executed at runtime.
- the dynamic part would correspond to our original , unobfuscated, program.
- the static part would correspond to our bogus inner program, which, if it were identified, could be evaluated and removed at deobfuscation time.
- partial evaluation is sensitive to aliasing. Hence, the same preventive transformations that were discussed in relation to slicing also applies to partial evaluation.
- the top-level loop of an obfuscation tool can have this general structure:
- SelectCode returns the next source code object to be obfuscated.
- SelectTransform returns the transformation which should be used to obfuscate the particular source code object. Apply applies the transformation to the source code object and updates the application accordingly. Done determines when the required level of obfuscation has been attained. The complexity of these functions will depend on the sophistication of the obfuscation tool. At the simplistic end of the scale, SelectCode and SelectTransform could simply return random source code object/transformations , and Done could terminate the loop when the size of the applica- tion exceeds a certain limit. Normally, such behavior is insufficient.
- Algorithm 1 gives a description of a code obfuscation tool with a much more sophisticated selection and termination behavior.
- the algorithm makes use of several data structures, which are constructed by Algorithms 5, 6, and 7:
- P S (S) is the set of language constructs the programmer used in S.
- P S (S) is used to find appropriate obfuscating transformations for S.
- T n --> V n ⁇ is a mapping from transformations T ⁇ to values V if describing how appropriate it would be to apply Ti to S.
- the idea is that certain transformations may be inappropriate for a particular source code object S, because they introduce new code which is "unnatural 1 ' to S . The new code would look out of place in S and hence would be easy to spot for a reverse engineer. The higher the appropriateness value Vi the better the code introduced by transformation T ⁇ will fit in.
- I (S) is the obfuscation priority of S.
- I (S) describes how important it is to obfuscate the contents of S. If S contains an important trade secret then
- I (S) will be high, if it contains mainly " "bread-and-butter ' ' code I(S) will be low.
- R (M) is the execution time rank of M .
- R(M) 1 if more time is spent executing M than any other routine.
- the primary input to Algorithm 1 is an application A and a set of obfuscating transformations ⁇ 1 1 ; T 2 ; . . . ⁇ .
- the algorithm also requires information regarding each transformation, particularly three quality functions T res (S), T pot (S), and T cost (S) (similar to their namesakes in Section 5, but returning numerical values) and a function P t :
- T res (S) returns a measure of the resilience of transformation T when applied to source code object S (i.e., how well T will withstand an attack from an automatic deobfuscator) .
- T pot (S) returns a measure of the potency of transformation T when applied to source code object S (i.e., how much more difficult S will be for a human to understand after having been obfuscated by T) .
- T cost (S) returns a measure of the execution time and space penalty added by T to S .
- P t maps each transformation T to the set of language constructs that T will add to the application.
- Points 1 to 3 of Algorithm 1 load the application to be obfuscated, and builds appropriate internal data structures.
- Point 4 builds P S (S), A(S), I (S) , and R(M ) .
- Point 5 applies obfuscating transformations until the required obfuscation level has been attained or until the maximum execution time penalty is exceeded.
- Point 6 finally, rewrites the new application A' .
- An application A made up of source code or object code files Cl ; C2 ; . .
- An obfuscated application A' made up of source code or object code files.
- the obfuscator could either (a) load source code files, in which case the obfuscator would have to contain a complete compiler front-end performing lexical, syntactic, and semantic analysis, (a less powerful obfuscator that restricts itself to purely syntactic transformation could manage without semantic analysis) or
- a typical set of data structures might include: (a) A control-flow graph for each routine in A.
- I maps each source code object S to I (S) , which is a measure of how important it is to obfuscate S.
- I a measure of how important it is to obfuscate S.
- I a priority queue. In other words, we select S so that I (S) is maximized.
- the chosen transformation must blend in naturally with the rest of the code in S. This can be handled by favoring transformations with a high appropriateness value in A(S).
- the Done function serves two purposes . It updates the priority queue I to reflect the fact that the source code object S has been obfuscated, and should receive a reduced priority value . The reduction is based on a combination of the resilience and potency of the transformation. Done also updates ReqObf and AcceptCost, and determines whether the termination condition has been reached.
- w-_, w 2 , w 3 , w 4 are implementation-defined constants :
- mapping R(M) which, for every routine M in A, gives the execution time rank of M .
- mapping P s (S) which, for every source code object S in A, gives the set of language constructs used in S.
- Compute pragmatic information This information will be used to choose the right type of transformation for each particular source code object .
- Compute dynamic pragmatic information i.e., run the application under a profiler on the input data set I provided by the user.
- Compute R(M) the execution time rank of M for each routine/basic block, indicating where the application spends most of its time.
- O The set of operators that S uses
- C The set of high-level language constructs (WHILE statements, exceptions, threads, etc.) that S uses;
- L The set of library classes/routines that S references
- a mapping I (S) which, for each source code object S in A, gives the obfuscation priority of S.
- I (S) can be provided explicitly by the user, or it can be computed using a heuristic based on the statistical data gathered in Algorithm 5. Possible heuristics might be:
- I(S) be the complexity of S, as defined by one of the software complexity metrics in Table 1. Again, the (possibly flawed) intuition is that complex code is more likely to contain important trade secrets than simple code.
- a mapping A(S) which, for each source code object S in A and each transformation T , gives the appropriateness of T with respect to S.
- the mapping is based primarily on the static pragmatic information computed in Algorithm 5.
- FIG. 31 For an overview of all the transformations that have been discussed above, see FIG. 31.
- FIG. 32 For an overview of the opaque constructs that have been discussed above, see FIG. 32.
- the present invention should not be limited to the exemplary transformations and opaque constructs discussed above .
- the present invention provides a computer implemented method and apparatus for preventing, or at least hampering, reverse engineering of software. While this may be effected at the expense of execution time or program size with the resulting
- SUBSTTUTE SHEET (RULE 26) transformed program behaving differently at a detailed level, it is believed that the present technique provides significant utility in appropriate circumstances.
- the transformed program has the same observable behavior as the untransformed program. Accordingly, the present invention allows for such weak equivalence between the original and obfuscated program.
Abstract
Description
Claims
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AU79579/98A AU7957998A (en) | 1997-06-09 | 1998-06-09 | Obfuscation techniques for enhancing software security |
CA2293650A CA2293650C (en) | 1997-06-09 | 1998-06-09 | Obfuscation techniques for enhancing software security |
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JP2002514333A (en) | 2002-05-14 |
US6668325B1 (en) | 2003-12-23 |
JP4739465B2 (en) | 2011-08-03 |
EP0988591A1 (en) | 2000-03-29 |
AU7957998A (en) | 1999-01-25 |
CA2293650C (en) | 2012-09-25 |
CA2293650A1 (en) | 1999-01-14 |
CN1260055A (en) | 2000-07-12 |
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