CN101887385A - Microprocessor and produce the method for uncertain key - Google Patents

Microprocessor and produce the method for uncertain key Download PDF

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Publication number
CN101887385A
CN101887385A CN201010243162XA CN201010243162A CN101887385A CN 101887385 A CN101887385 A CN 101887385A CN 201010243162X A CN201010243162X A CN 201010243162XA CN 201010243162 A CN201010243162 A CN 201010243162A CN 101887385 A CN101887385 A CN 101887385A
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mentioned
microprocessor
key
identification code
exclusive
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CN201010243162XA
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CN101887385B (en
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G·葛兰·亨利
泰瑞·派克斯
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Via Technologies Inc
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Via Technologies Inc
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Priority claimed from US12/781,124 external-priority patent/US8316243B2/en
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Abstract

Microprocessor and produce the method for uncertain key, this microprocessor is included in to be made during the above-mentioned microprocessor, is stored in one in the above-mentioned microprocessor in a non-volatile mode and makes identification code.Above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive.Above-mentioned microprocessor also comprises an encryption key, and it is stored in the inside of above-mentioned microprocessor and can't be read by the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor.Above-mentioned microprocessor also comprises an advanced encryption standard crypto engine, in order to receive above-mentioned manufacturing identification code and above-mentioned encryption key, and use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor an exclusive uncertain key.

Description

Microprocessor and produce the method for uncertain key
Technical field
The present invention relates to encrypt the generation of the encrypting key of particularly exclusive (unique).
Background technology
Safe context (context), promptly particular microprocessor exclusive number or key, need.One of mode is to make exclusive sequence number in microprocessor.Yet because sequence number has structural (structured) and repeatability, so sequence number is very easy to predicted arriving.In many safe contexts, high predictability is not an advantage.
United States Patent (USP) notification number the 5th, 790, No. 783, the 5th, 790, No. 663 and the 5th, 774, No. 544 etc. patent is described the method and apparatus that the sequence number of microprocessor is encrypted and deciphered, wherein this legacy system discloses integrated circuit encapsulation and comprises that (wherein two crystal grain are coupled in together by serial line interface for Non-volatile random access memory, NVRAM) crystal grain for a central processing unit (CPU) crystal grain (die) and a nonvolatile ram.Manufacturer is provided with the special module register with sequence number of wanting, and (Model Specific Register MSR) gives central processing unit, and other two special module registers with key inequality are set.According to encrypting algorithm, central processing unit then can use first key that sequence number is encrypted, and uses second key that the sequence number and first key encrypted are encrypted then.Then, central processing unit can (cyclic redundancy check CRC) writes in the nonvolatile ram with the sequence number of double-encryption (double-encrypted) and a crc value.
In addition, the open manufacturer of legacy system can be provided with the special module register with second key.Then, central processing unit reads out the sequence number (checking this crc value) of double-encryption from nonvolatile ram, and uses second key that the sequence number of double-encryption is decrypted the sequence number and first key to obtain single encryption (singly-encrypted).Then, central processing unit uses first key deciphered that the sequence number of single encryption is decrypted and the sequence number of having been deciphered, and the sequence number that will decipher is stored in the special module register.Write sequence number to nonvolatile ram and only can not pin from the action that nonvolatile ram reads out sequence number under the situation of (unlocked) and just can be performed at processor, it occurs in when processor detects the nonvolatile ram no-output or works as manufacturer's setting has under the situation of present processor sequence number and two keys, and wherein two keys are used for making sequence number and mate with sequence number.
Legacy system also discloses application programming interfaces (Application Programming Interface, API), it allows the software of serializing (serialize) (promptly to chain to the software of a processor sequence number, make this software to be performed having on the processor of another sequence number, for example under the situation that processor is upgraded) can have the special module register of second key and read out the sequence number of central processing unit from nonvolatile ram by setting.Second key also is stored in the complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) of system, and (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor is CMOS) in the element.Application programming interfaces also provide and allow serializing software to read recently by the function of the sequence number of the central processing unit that system stored (may be stored in cmos device or the disk).If when both values were identical, then serializing software can continue to be performed.Otherwise serializing software can think that the user upgrades to the new central processing unit with new sequence number with this central processing unit, and calls out Another Application routine interface function, and it needs to authorize (authorization) to be performed on new central processing unit.If authorize licensedly, then serializing software can use the sequence number of new central processing unit to come executive software to pin.Otherwise serializing software can not be performed, otherwise is performed under limited ability exactly.
The disclosed method of legacy system has some shortcoming.At first, though two encrypting keys of legacy system and encryption algorithm are only known by manufacturer, be stored in the special module register yet possible risk is two keys, it can be read by the user.Moreover second key is stored in the cmos device of system.So, go out by the legacy system deducibility:, but can stop the user to obtain undelegated access without heart although this System and method for can't provide complete protection to prevent key or sequence number are carried out uncommitted access.Though legacy system uses two independently encrypting keys, yet each encrypting key only has 32, it is not safe for many application.At last, only there are needs to read sequence number in two encrypting keys.
Summary of the invention
The invention provides a kind of microprocessor.Above-mentioned microprocessor comprises: one makes identification code, during making above-mentioned microprocessor, is stored in the above-mentioned microprocessor in a non-volatile mode, and wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive; One encryption key is stored in the inside of above-mentioned microprocessor, and can't be read by the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor; And an advanced encryption standard (AES) crypto engine in order to receiving above-mentioned manufacturing identification code and above-mentioned encryption key, and uses above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor an exclusive uncertain key.
Moreover, the invention provides a kind of method that produces uncertain key.Said method comprises: during making a microprocessor, store one in a non-volatile mode and make identification code in above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive; In the mode that can't read, store the inside of an encryption key in above-mentioned microprocessor from the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor; And, use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor an exclusive uncertain key, wherein above-mentioned encrypting step is performed by an advanced encryption standard crypto engine of above-mentioned microprocessor.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 shows according to the described microprocessor of one embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 2 is the calcspar of the operation of microprocessor in the displayed map 1; And
Fig. 3 is the process flow diagram of the operation of microprocessor in the displayed map 1.
[main element symbol description]
100~microprocessor; 132~special module register;
134~manufacturing identification code; 136~key;
142~exclusive uncertain key; 601~extraction logic unit;
602~translation logic unit; 603~transfer interpreter;
604~microcode ROM (read-only memory); 605~register;
606~address; 607~be written into;
608~carry out;
609,611,613,615~micro-order formation;
610~integer unit; 612~floating point unit;
614~MMX unit; 616~SSE unit;
617~Cryptographic unit; 618~storage;
619~write-back; 620~be written into bus;
621~idle signal; 622~memory bus
624~EFLAGS register; 625~X position;
626~interrupt logic unit; 627~micro-order;
628~MSR register; 629~E position;
630~FCR register; 631~D position;
632~performance element; And 633~bus.
Embodiment
For above-mentioned and other purposes of the present invention, feature and advantage can be become apparent, cited below particularlyly go out preferred embodiment, and conjunction with figs., be described in detail below:
Embodiment:
With reference to figure 1, Fig. 1 shows according to the described microprocessor 100 of one embodiment of the invention.When making each other microprocessor 100, can produce exclusive uncertain key (uniqueunpredictable key, uukey) 142, it is that this microprocessor 100 is exclusive, and can be unpredictable fully for user's security purpose, for example can be used as encrypting key.136 pairs of manufacturings of the key identification code 134 that is hidden in microprocessor 100 inside by use is carried out advanced encryption standard (Advanced Encryption Standard, AES) encrypt, to realize producing exclusive uncertain key 142, wherein make identification code 134 persons of being to use visual (visible) and measurable (predictable) processor exclusive sequence number, and key 136 can't be seen from the outside by anyone and only known by the personnel of only a few.Yet, access keys 136 that microprocessor 100 can internally (promptly pass through the microcode in the microcode ROM (read-only memory) 604) is to the advanced encryption standard engine, it can use 136 pairs of predictable manufacturing identification codes 134 of key to encrypt, to produce exclusive uncertain key 142.Exclusive uncertain key 142 can be used in the different application; the shielded special module register of access (Model Specific Register, MSR) encrypt/decrypt of 132 password, microcode patching (patch) or in software protection mechanism, use exclusive uncertain key 142 for example in conjunction with the specific microprocessor 100 of the use to of software.
Because embodiments of the invention are to use and can't will make identification code 134 from the key 136 that the outside is seen and be encrypted in the exclusive uncertain key 142, the exclusive uncertain key of having encrypted 142 is not only exclusive, and is uncertain.Otherwise previous described legacy system can't provide complete protection to prevent key or sequence number are carried out undelegated access, but only can stop the user to obtain undelegated access without heart.
Moreover compared to legacy system, system described in the invention does not need nonvolatile ram (NVRAM) in the encapsulation of central processing unit.Legacy system need use nonvolatile ram, reason is that legacy system can produce the sequence number of the central processing unit of double-encryption in its manufacture process, and with the sequence number of this central processing unit programming (program) to the part nonvolatile memory, make processor under the situation of upgrading, can change the sequence number of central processing unit.Otherwise embodiment described in the invention can use the key 136 that can't read from the outside in the microprocessor 100 to produce exclusive uncertain key 142 in the operation of microprocessor 100.In this field, need produce exclusive uncertain key 142 by manufacturing identification code 134 is encrypted at every turn, wherein make identification code 134 and be non-volatile (promptly in the manufacture process of microprocessor 100, programming) by blowout.
The microprocessor 100 of Fig. 1 comprises manufacturing identification code 134 and the key 136 that is coupled to performance element 632, and it is all received by Cryptographic unit 617.According to an embodiment, Cryptographic unit 617 comprises an advanced encryption standard crypto engine (AES encryption engine), in order to use key 136 expressly (plain text) be encrypted as ciphertext (cypher text), and be plaintext with decrypt ciphertext.By using key 136 (promptly outside not visible) exclusive predictable manufacturing identification code 134 is encrypted, the advanced encryption standard crypto engine of Cryptographic unit 617 can produce each indivedual microprocessor 100 exclusive uncertain key 142, describe as the calcspar of Fig. 2 and the process flow diagram of Fig. 3.
With reference to figure 3, Fig. 3 is the process flow diagram of the operation of microprocessor in the displayed map 1.Flow process begins in step 302.
In step 302, software application requires to produce exclusive uncertain key.Then, flow process enters step 304.
In step 304, the microcode of microprocessor reads to temporary transient register with key and manufacturing identification code.Then, flow process enters step 306.
In step 306, microcode indication advanced encryption standard crypto engine uses key to encrypt making identification code.Then, flow process enters step 308.
In step 308, the advanced encryption standard crypto engine uses key to encrypt making identification code, to produce exclusive uncertain key.Then, flow process enters step 312.
In step 312, microcode is loaded into the framework register with exclusive uncertain key, reads for software application.Flow process finishes in step 312.
If assailant (attacker) learns one of them the manufacturing identification code 134 in numerous microprocessors 100 of manufacturer, then make identification code 134 for predictable, promptly the assailant can relatively easily dope in numerous microprocessors 100 of manufacturer another manufacturing identification code 134.Reason is to make identification code 134 and intentionally is set at and has higher structurally, promptly makes identification code 134 for continuous relatively.Making identification code 134 can be used, and for making relevant purpose, for example for the purpose of failure analysis, can identify this microprocessor 100 from which particular batch (patch) in the manufacture process by making identification code 134.Moreover, guess password or key about computed ability, the number quantity of the possible manufacturing identification code 134 of numerous microprocessors 100 of manufacturer (for example tens million of or several hundred million) is relatively little.Owing to make identification code 134 for very predictable, therefore make identification code 134 and be not suitable for being used as key and use.Otherwise with regard at least two reasons, exclusive uncertain key 142 is uncertain.First reason is, as long as employed encryption algorithm can produce uncertain value, then add exclusive uncertain key 142 that secret meeting causes being produced for very unpredictable to making identification code 134, for example, according to an embodiment, use the advanced encryption standard of 128 place values of 128 encryption key to encrypt algorithm.Being got cicada even the advantage of advanced encryption standard encryption algorithm is two projects in three projects (making identification code 134, key 136 and exclusive uncertain key 142), is to calculate the 3rd project in the time of meaningful length (meaningful length) by the present or following ability.Second reason be, exclusive uncertain key 142 is 128, and it can produce the probable value of enough big quantity, and wherein these probable values are that present computer capacity is unpredictable.
Key 136 is hardware type (hardwired) in microprocessor 100, and can read by the microcode in the microcode unit in the microprocessor 100 (for example the microcode ROM (read-only memory) 604), but can't be read by the outside institute of microprocessor 100.In one embodiment, for the whole circumstances (all instances) of the microprocessor 100 of manufacturer, key 136 is identical.Because for the microprocessor 100 of whole manufacturers, it is exclusive making identification code 134, can guarantee that therefore the exclusive uncertain key 142 that other microprocessors 100 of relevant manufacturer are produced is exclusive.In one embodiment, key 136 is only known by the personnel that the small part of manufacturer is authorized to.In one embodiment, key 136 is 128.In one embodiment, manufacturing identification code 134 is 50 a value, and it can use 78 extra bits to fill up (according to an embodiment earlier before being encrypted by the advanced encryption standard crypto engine, it also is a secret) so that produce exclusive uncertain key 142.In one embodiment, it is burned in the fuse of microprocessor 100 that manufacturer can will make identification code 134 in manufacture process.Making identification code 134 can read by special module register.Making identification code 134 is predictable Ser.No. (sequential number).
Generally speaking, embodiments of the invention can be applicable in any application that needs uncertain key, and wherein uncertain key is that each processor is exclusive, for example can be in conjunction with software in a par-ticular processor.The part application-specific of exclusive uncertain key 142 comprises encrypts and limits access to special module register to microcode patching.
Except previous described advantage, method described in the invention also can be saved fuse.Fuse in the microprocessor 100 can be used in non-volatile mode stores exclusive uncertain key 142, rather than produces exclusive uncertain key 142 with the cardinal rule of needs.Yet, be taken as at exclusive uncertain key 142 under the situation of key use, can provide the key of strong security will use at least 128 fuses, according to an embodiment, it will be more than the twice more than the quantity of making identification code 134 employed fuses.
Though the present invention is with preferred embodiment openly as above, so it is not in order to limiting the present invention, those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, when doing a little change and retouching.For example, but the software activation is function, manufacturing, modelling, simulation, description and/or the test of device and method as described in the present invention, and it can be by using universal programming language (for example C, C++), comprising that hardware description language (HDL) or other the available programs of Verilog, HDL, VHDL etc. realize.Above-mentioned software can be arranged in any known computer usable medium, for example tape, semiconductor, disk, CD (as CD-ROM, DVD-ROM etc.), network, wired line, wireless or other communication medias.The embodiment of device and method of the present invention can be included in the semiconductor intellecture property kernel, micro-processor kernel (specializing) for example by HDL, and convert the hardware product of integrated circuit to.In addition, the described device and method of the embodiment of the invention can hardware and the combination of software specialize.Therefore, the present invention should not be defined in disclosed embodiment, is as the criterion and should look the appended claims person of defining.Particularly, invention can be implemented in the micro processor, apparatus, it can be used in multi-purpose computer.At last, those skilled in the art can without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, can do a little change and retouch to reach identical purpose of the present invention based on notion disclosed in this invention and specific embodiment.

Claims (16)

1. microprocessor comprises:
One makes identification code, during making above-mentioned microprocessor, is stored in the above-mentioned microprocessor in a non-volatile mode, and wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive;
One encryption key is stored in the inside of above-mentioned microprocessor, and can't be read by the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor; And
One advanced encryption standard crypto engine in order to receiving above-mentioned manufacturing identification code and above-mentioned encryption key, and uses above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor an exclusive uncertain key.
2. microprocessor as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned uncertain key only is stored in above-mentioned microprocessor internal in easy mistake mode.
3. microprocessor as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code are during making above-mentioned microprocessor, use in above-mentioned non-volatile mode to be arranged at the fuse in the above-mentioned microprocessor and to be stored in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
4. microprocessor as claimed in claim 1, the above-mentioned microprocessor of wherein same manufacturer manufacturing has identical above-mentioned encryption key.
5. microprocessor as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned microprocessor be in order to the request corresponding to a software application, and produce above-mentioned microprocessor exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key, wherein above-mentioned software application is executed in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
6. microprocessor as claimed in claim 1 also comprises:
One microcode unit, in order to indicate above-mentioned advanced encryption standard crypto engine to use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key, and the above-mentioned uncertain key that will produce is loaded into a framework register of above-mentioned microprocessor.
7. microprocessor as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned encryption key internally is manufactured in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
8. microprocessor as claimed in claim 1, wherein above-mentioned encryption key are above-mentioned advanced encryption standard crypto engine employed unique encrypting keys when above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key.
9. method that produces uncertain key comprises:
During making a microprocessor, to store one in a non-volatile mode and make identification code in above-mentioned microprocessor, wherein above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is that above-mentioned microprocessor is exclusive;
In the mode that can't read, store the inside of an encryption key in above-mentioned microprocessor from the outside of above-mentioned microprocessor; And
Use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor an exclusive uncertain key, wherein above-mentioned encrypting step is performed by an advanced encryption standard crypto engine of above-mentioned microprocessor.
10. method as claimed in claim 9 also comprises:
Only, store above-mentioned uncertain key in above-mentioned microprocessor internal in easy mistake mode.
11. method as claimed in claim 9 wherein during making above-mentioned microprocessor, is stored the step of above-mentioned manufacturing identification code in above-mentioned microprocessor and is used in above-mentioned non-volatile mode and be arranged at the fuse in the above-mentioned microprocessor and be performed.
12. method as claimed in claim 9, the above-mentioned microprocessor of wherein same manufacturer manufacturing has identical above-mentioned encryption key.
13. method as claimed in claim 9, wherein ask corresponding to one of a software application, carry out the step of using above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key, wherein above-mentioned software application is executed in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
14. method as claimed in claim 9 also comprises:
Carry out the microcode in the above-mentioned microprocessor, to indicate above-mentioned advanced encryption standard crypto engine to use above-mentioned encryption key that above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, so that produce above-mentioned microprocessor exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key, and the above-mentioned uncertain key that will produce is loaded into a framework register of above-mentioned microprocessor.
15. method as claimed in claim 9, wherein above-mentioned encryption key internally is manufactured in the above-mentioned microprocessor.
16. method as claimed in claim 9, wherein above-mentioned encryption key are above-mentioned advanced encryption standard crypto engines employed unique encrypting key when above-mentioned manufacturing identification code is encrypted, with produce above-mentioned microprocessor exclusive above-mentioned uncertain key.
CN201010243162XA 2010-05-17 2010-07-28 Microprocessor and method for generating uncertain key Active CN101887385B (en)

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US12/781,124 2010-05-17
US12/781,124 US8316243B2 (en) 2009-08-07 2010-05-17 Apparatus and method for generating unpredictable processor-unique serial number for use as an encryption key

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102156843A (en) * 2011-03-28 2011-08-17 威盛电子股份有限公司 Data encryption method and system as well as data decryption method
CN102156843B (en) * 2011-03-28 2015-04-08 威盛电子股份有限公司 Data encryption method and system as well as data decryption method

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CN101887385B (en) 2013-04-10
TWI497344B (en) 2015-08-21

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