CA2420252C - System and method for implementing an enhanced transport layer security protocol - Google Patents
System and method for implementing an enhanced transport layer security protocol Download PDFInfo
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- CA2420252C CA2420252C CA002420252A CA2420252A CA2420252C CA 2420252 C CA2420252 C CA 2420252C CA 002420252 A CA002420252 A CA 002420252A CA 2420252 A CA2420252 A CA 2420252A CA 2420252 C CA2420252 C CA 2420252C
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/166—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the transport layer
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
- G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0884—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/02—Protocols based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/04—Protocols specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
- H04L69/30—Definitions, standards or architectural aspects of layered protocol stacks
- H04L69/32—Architecture of open systems interconnection [OSI] 7-layer type protocol stacks, e.g. the interfaces between the data link level and the physical level
- H04L69/322—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions
- H04L69/329—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions in the application layer [OSI layer 7]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
- G07B17/00467—Transporting mailpieces
- G07B2017/00491—Mail/envelope/insert handling system
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/61—Time-dependent
Abstract
A system and method for implementing an enhanced transport layer security (ETLS) protocol is provided. The system includes a primary server, an ETLS
servlet and an ETLS software module. The primary server operates on a computer network and is configured to communicate over the computer network using a non-proprietary security protocol. The ETLS servlet also operates on the computer network and is securely coupled to the primary server. The ETLS servlet is configured to communicate over the computer network using an ETLS security protocol. The ETLS software module operates on a mobile device, and is configured to communicate over the computer network using either the non-proprietary security protocol or the ETLS security protocol. Operationally, the ETLS software module initially contacts the server over the computer network using the non-proprietary security protocol, and subsequently contacts the server through the ETLS servlet using the ETLS security protocol.
servlet and an ETLS software module. The primary server operates on a computer network and is configured to communicate over the computer network using a non-proprietary security protocol. The ETLS servlet also operates on the computer network and is securely coupled to the primary server. The ETLS servlet is configured to communicate over the computer network using an ETLS security protocol. The ETLS software module operates on a mobile device, and is configured to communicate over the computer network using either the non-proprietary security protocol or the ETLS security protocol. Operationally, the ETLS software module initially contacts the server over the computer network using the non-proprietary security protocol, and subsequently contacts the server through the ETLS servlet using the ETLS security protocol.
Description
System And Method For Implementing An Enhanced Transport Layer Security Protacol 1. FIELD OF THE INVENTION
This invention relates generally to the field of computer network security protocols. More particularly, the invention provides an enhanced transport layer security ("ETLS") protocol that is especially well-suited for use with mobile communication devices, such as Personal Digital Assistants, cellular telephones, and wireless two-way e-mail communication devices (collectively referred to hereinafter as "mobile devices").
This invention relates generally to the field of computer network security protocols. More particularly, the invention provides an enhanced transport layer security ("ETLS") protocol that is especially well-suited for use with mobile communication devices, such as Personal Digital Assistants, cellular telephones, and wireless two-way e-mail communication devices (collectively referred to hereinafter as "mobile devices").
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE RELATED ART
Security protocols for establishing a secure connection to a computer network, such as the Internet, are known. A security protocoi commonly used to securely connect to an Internet host is the Transport Layer Security ("TLS") protocol, which was formerly known as the Secure Socket Layer ("SSL") protocol.
Fig. 1 is a signal flow diagram 10 illustrating the basic steps typically used to establish a secure connection between a client 12 and an Internet server 14 using the TLS protocol. In step 16, an initial datagram is transmitted from the client 12 to the server 14 to establish contact and to identify the algorithms or languages that the client 12 is capable of supporting. Once the initial datagram is received, the server 14 typically accepts the connection and replies with a datagram that identifies the algorithms or languages that the server will support (step 18). In additirs,-,~, the reply datagram from the server 14 typically includes a public key in a digital certificate that authenticates the identity of the server 14.
The digital certificate is generally acquired from a trusted third-party, such as VeriSignTM or some other certificate authority, which verifies that the public key belongs to the server 14. In addition, the public key typically has an associated private key that is maintained only by the server 14, whereby data encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted using the private key.
In steps 20 and 22, the client 12 negotiates a session key with the server 14. The session key is typically a random number generated by the client 12 that is used for only one fetch-response operation between the client 12 and server 14.
The random session key is typically first used to encrypt some random data as "proof of the key." The session key and the data are then encrypted with the public key and transmitted to the server in step 20. The session key and "proof of key" data are decrypted by the server using its private key. The "proof of key"
data is then further decrypted with the session key. Then, in step 22, the server typically transmits the "proof of key" data back to the client 12 to establish that it has properly received and decrypted the session key.
Once the TLS public key has been exchanged and a session key has been negotiated, a secure TLS socket is established, and application data may be securely transmitted between the client 12 and server 14 using the session key (step 24). By utilizing this four-pass handshake between a client and a server each time a communication is initiated, the TLS protocol ensures both the authenticity of the server and the originality of the transmission. For example, to illustrate the importance of originality, if a user has communicated with a bank server via a client to electronically transfer money from an account, the four-pass TLS handshake prevents the transfer operation from being repeated by "replaying" the same encrypted message from either the same client or another client if the communication was intercepted.
Although the TLS protocol provides a secure connection to a server, this protocol is not well-suited for mobile applications because the datagrams transferred in the TLS four-pass handshake typically contain a relatively large amount of data that cannot be quickly transferred over a wireless network.
Therefore, in order to reduce the number of datagrams transferred over the wireless network, mobile applications commonly utilize a Wireless Application Protocol ("WAP") to establish a secure connection with an Internet server.
Fig. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a typical mobile communication system 30 utilizing the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP). In this system 30, a service request from a mobile device 32 that is addressed to a server 34 is encoded using a Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) protocol and transmitted through a wireless gateway 36 to a WAP Gateway 38, which typically acts as a proxy to the Internet. The wireless gateway and WAP gateway may or may not be co-located. Typically, the WAP Gateway 38 has its own digital certificate, signed by a trusted third-party that is used by the mobile device 32 to validate its authenticity. Once the WTLS-encrypted service request is received, the WAP Gateway 38 generally establishes a TLS connection over the Internet with the server 34. The service request is then decrypted by the WAP Gateway 38, re-encrypted using the TLS protocol and sent over the Internet to the server 34. To respond to the service request, the server 34 typically transmits TLS-encrypted data to the WAP Gateway 3 8, which is then decrypted and re-encrypted using the WTLS protocol and transmitted to the mobile device 32. Although this system 30 is typically faster than the TLS protocol for mobile applications, it leaves a gap in the secure link, thereby risking that data may be intercepted while it is in plaintext format in the WAP Gateway 38.
Security protocols for establishing a secure connection to a computer network, such as the Internet, are known. A security protocoi commonly used to securely connect to an Internet host is the Transport Layer Security ("TLS") protocol, which was formerly known as the Secure Socket Layer ("SSL") protocol.
Fig. 1 is a signal flow diagram 10 illustrating the basic steps typically used to establish a secure connection between a client 12 and an Internet server 14 using the TLS protocol. In step 16, an initial datagram is transmitted from the client 12 to the server 14 to establish contact and to identify the algorithms or languages that the client 12 is capable of supporting. Once the initial datagram is received, the server 14 typically accepts the connection and replies with a datagram that identifies the algorithms or languages that the server will support (step 18). In additirs,-,~, the reply datagram from the server 14 typically includes a public key in a digital certificate that authenticates the identity of the server 14.
The digital certificate is generally acquired from a trusted third-party, such as VeriSignTM or some other certificate authority, which verifies that the public key belongs to the server 14. In addition, the public key typically has an associated private key that is maintained only by the server 14, whereby data encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted using the private key.
In steps 20 and 22, the client 12 negotiates a session key with the server 14. The session key is typically a random number generated by the client 12 that is used for only one fetch-response operation between the client 12 and server 14.
The random session key is typically first used to encrypt some random data as "proof of the key." The session key and the data are then encrypted with the public key and transmitted to the server in step 20. The session key and "proof of key" data are decrypted by the server using its private key. The "proof of key"
data is then further decrypted with the session key. Then, in step 22, the server typically transmits the "proof of key" data back to the client 12 to establish that it has properly received and decrypted the session key.
Once the TLS public key has been exchanged and a session key has been negotiated, a secure TLS socket is established, and application data may be securely transmitted between the client 12 and server 14 using the session key (step 24). By utilizing this four-pass handshake between a client and a server each time a communication is initiated, the TLS protocol ensures both the authenticity of the server and the originality of the transmission. For example, to illustrate the importance of originality, if a user has communicated with a bank server via a client to electronically transfer money from an account, the four-pass TLS handshake prevents the transfer operation from being repeated by "replaying" the same encrypted message from either the same client or another client if the communication was intercepted.
Although the TLS protocol provides a secure connection to a server, this protocol is not well-suited for mobile applications because the datagrams transferred in the TLS four-pass handshake typically contain a relatively large amount of data that cannot be quickly transferred over a wireless network.
Therefore, in order to reduce the number of datagrams transferred over the wireless network, mobile applications commonly utilize a Wireless Application Protocol ("WAP") to establish a secure connection with an Internet server.
Fig. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a typical mobile communication system 30 utilizing the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP). In this system 30, a service request from a mobile device 32 that is addressed to a server 34 is encoded using a Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) protocol and transmitted through a wireless gateway 36 to a WAP Gateway 38, which typically acts as a proxy to the Internet. The wireless gateway and WAP gateway may or may not be co-located. Typically, the WAP Gateway 38 has its own digital certificate, signed by a trusted third-party that is used by the mobile device 32 to validate its authenticity. Once the WTLS-encrypted service request is received, the WAP Gateway 38 generally establishes a TLS connection over the Internet with the server 34. The service request is then decrypted by the WAP Gateway 38, re-encrypted using the TLS protocol and sent over the Internet to the server 34. To respond to the service request, the server 34 typically transmits TLS-encrypted data to the WAP Gateway 3 8, which is then decrypted and re-encrypted using the WTLS protocol and transmitted to the mobile device 32. Although this system 30 is typically faster than the TLS protocol for mobile applications, it leaves a gap in the secure link, thereby risking that data may be intercepted while it is in plaintext format in the WAP Gateway 38.
SUMMARY
A system and method for implementing an i;nhanced transport layer security (ETLS) protocol is provided. The system includes a primary server, an ETLS
servlet and an ETLS software module. The primary server operates on a computer network and is configured to communicate over the computer network using a non-proprietary security protocol. The ETLS servlet also operates on the computer network and is securely coupled to the primary server. The ETLS servlet is configured to communicate over the computer network using en ETLS security protocol. The ETLS software module operates on a mobile device, and is configured to communicate over the computer network using either the non-proprietary security protocol or the F;TLS security protocol.
Operationally, the ETLS software module initially contacts the server over the computer network sing the non-proprietary security protocol, and subsequently contacts the server through the ETLS
servlet using the ETLS security protocol.
In an aspect of the invention, there is provided a method for securely communicating with a server operating on a computer network, comprising the steps of providing a servlet that securely communicates witli the server; providing a connection log maintained by the servlet that stores one or more transmissions received by the servlet;
sending an encrypted transmission to the servlet ov.-r the computer network;
receiving the encrypted transmission at the servlet; decrypting th,, encrypted transmission with the servlet to generate a decrypted transmission; comparing the decrypted transmission with the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log to determine if the decrypted transmission is original; and if the decrypted transntission is original, then transferring the decrypted transmission from the servlet to the serve-r, wherein the servlet has a unique location on the computer network, and comprising :he additional step of receiving the unique location of the servlet from the server; wherein the unique location of the servlet is used to send the encrypted transmission to the servlet over the computer network.
In another aspect, there is provided a method for securely communicating between a mobile device and a server operating on a compuler network, comprising the steps of providing a security servlet operating on the computer network, wherein the security servlet communicates with the server via a secure link, and is identified by a unique location on the computer network; establishing a wireless connection between the mobile device and the computer network; establishing a secure connection between the mobile device and the server using a non-proprietary security protocol; sending a first encrypted service request from the mobile device to the server via the non-proprietary security protocol; sending a first encrypted response from the server to the mobile device that includes the unique location of the security servlet on the computer network;
sending a second encrypted service request from the mobile device to the security servlet using the unique location of the security servlet; decrypting the second encrypted service request with the security servlet to generate a decrypted sewice request; transferring the decrypted service request from the security servlet to the server.
In yet a further aspect, there is provided a s,,-cure server, comprising a primary server operating on a computer network; a security servlet operating on the computer network and securely coupled to the primary server and configured to decrypt an encrypted service request received from the computer network to generate a decrypted service request; and a connection log coupled to th,,- security servlet that stores one or more previous service requests received by the security servlet; wherein the security servlet first verifies that the encrypted service requ,-st is original by comparing the decrypted service request with the one or more pre vious service requests stored in the connection log, and then transfers the decrypted se:-vice request to the primary server;
wherein the security servlet is configured to decrypt a first service request type that is encrypted using a proprietary security protocol and the primary server is configured to decrypt a second service request type that is encrypted using a non-proprietary security protocol.
In yet a further aspect, there is provided an enhanced transport layer security (ETLS) system for a mobile device, comprising a frimary server operating on a computer network and configured to communicate over the computer network using a non-proprietary security protocol; an ETLS servlet operating on the computer network and securely coupled to the server, wherein the ETLS servlet is configured to communicate over the computer network using an ETLS security protocol; an ETLS software module operating on the mobile device that is configured to communicate over the computer network using either the non-proprietary security protocol or the ETLS
security protocol;
wherein the ETLS software module initially contacts the server over the computer network using the non-proprietary security protocol and subsequently contacts the server through the ETLS servlet using the ETLS security protocol.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
5a Fig. 1 is a signal flow diagram illustrating the basic steps typically used to establish a secure connection between a client and an Internet server using the TLS
protocol;
Fig. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a typical mobile communication system utilizing a wireless Application Protocol (WAP);
5b Fig. 3 is a signal flow diagram illustrating a wireless communication between a client and a server using an enhanced transport layer security ("ETLS") protocol;
Fig. 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary ETLS system illustrating a secure connection between a mobile device and an HTTP server using the ETLS
protocol; and Fig. 5 is a flow diagram of an exemplary method for securely communicating between a mobile device and a network server using the ETLS
protocol.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Referring now to the remaining drawing figures, Fig. 3 is a signal flow diagram 40 illustrating a wireless communication between a client 42 and a server 44 using an enhanced transport layer security ("ETLS") protocol. The client 42 may be any system operating on a mobile. device that is capable of wirelessly accessing a computer network. The server 44 preferably includes a primary server, such as an HTTP server 46, and an ETLS servlet 48, both operating on a computer network, such as the Internet. The ETLS servlet 48, discussed in more detail below with reference to Fig. 4, is preferably a JAVATM servlet operating on the HTTP server 46, but could alternatively be some other server-side mechanism such as a CGI script. The ETLS servlet 48 is preferably installed on the HTTP
server 46 with its own uniform resource locator (URL), which is added to a custom HTTP response header along with an ETLS public key.
In step 50, the client 42 attempts to open -a secure connection with the server 44. At this point, the client 42 has not yet detected the ETLS servlet 48, and, therefore, uses a non-proprietary security protocol such as the TLS
protocol.
The TLS four-pass handshake, discussed above with reference to Fig. 1, is performed in steps 50-56. In steps 50 and 52, the client 42 and the server 44 determine which operations or languages they have in common, and a TLS public key in a digital certificate is transferred to the client 42. In steps 54 and 56, a random TLS session key is negotiated. Then, in step 58 the initial service request from the client 42 is encrypted with the TLS session key and transmitted to the HTTP server 46. The HTTP server 46 decrypts the service request and transmits its initial encrypted response in step 60. Along with the encrypted data, the initial response 60 from the HTTP server 46 also includes the custom HTTP response header with the URL of the ETLS servlet 48. and the ETLS public key. The ETLS
public key is preferably generated by the ETLS servlet 48, and has an associated ETLS private key that is maintained exclusively by the ETLS servlet 48. The client 42 preferably stores the ETLS public key and associated URL in a memory location on the mobile device. Thereafter, each time the client 42 establishes a secure connection to the server 44, it uses the ETLS public key and associated URL to communicate through the ETLS servlet 48.
Steps 62-68 illustrate two secure ETLS transmissions between the client 42 and the server 44 after the ETLS public key and associated URL have been received and stored by the client 42. To establish a secure connection using the ETLS protocol, the client 42 first establishes a random ETLS session key and encrypts it with the ETLS public key received from the custom HTTP response header. The client 42 then uses the ETLS session key to encrypt the bulk data that makes up its service request to the server 44 and also to encrypt a digital time-stamp. In step 62, the client 42 transmits the data to the ETLS servlet, preferably in the form of an HTTP POST request that includes the encrypted session key, service request and time-stamp. Once the ETLS servlet 48 has received the HTTP POST request, the request is decrypted and compared to a connection log to establish that the transmission is original. At this point, the security of the communication has been established, and the ETLS servlet 48 may perform a fetch-response operation with the HTTP server 46. Then, once a response from the HTTP server 46 has been returned, the ETLS servlet 48 encrypts the response with the ETLS session key and transmits it to the client in step 64. The ETLS protocol, including the operations of the digital time-stamp and the connection log, are discussed in more detail below with reference to Fig.
4.
Steps 66 and 68 illustrate that each subsequent communication between the client 42 and the server 44 may be performed using the same two-step ETLS
handshake described above with reference to steps 62 and 64. In this manner, the ETLS protocol enables secure communications between a mobile device and an Internet server without requiring the lengthy, multiple transmissions commonly associated with non-proprietary security protocols, such as the TLS protocol.
Fig. 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary ETLS system 70 illustrating a secure connection between a mobile device 72 and an primary server 74 using the ETLS protocol. Cross-referencing Figs. 3 and 4, the ETLS system 70 shown in Fig. 4 illustrates the ETLS connections made in steps 62-68 of Fig. 3, and after the initial TLS connection shown in steps 50-60 of Fig. 3. The ETLS system 70 includes the mobile device 72, the primary server 74, a wireless gateway 76, the ETLS servlet 78 and the connection log 80. The primary server 74, ETLS servlet 78 and connection log 80 are located on a computer network, such as the Internet, and are preferably protected behind a common firewall 82. Communications between the mobile device 72 and the computer network are preferably made through the wireless gateway 76 using any known Web browser-type software designed for use on a mobile device. The mobile device 72 preferably also includes an ETLS software module 71 that is configured to establish a secure connection with the compiuter network using either the ETLS protocol or a non-proprietary security protocol such as the TLS protocol.
To send a service request to the primary server 74 using the ETLS
protocol, the mobile device 72 preferably establishes a random ETLS session key that it uses to encrypt the service request, and encrypts the session key using the stored ETLS public key for the ETLS Servlet 78. In addition, to protect against "rep,lay" communications, an electronic time-stamp -is also preferably generated by the mobile device and encrypted using the ETLS session key. Then, the encrypted service request, session key and time-stamp are all bundled in an HTTP
POST request, or some other suitable transfer mechanism, and transmitted through the wireless gateway 76 to the ETLS servlet 78.
When the HTTP POST request is received at the ETLS serviet 78, the ETLS session key is preferably decrypted with the ETLS private key that is maintained by the ETLS servlet 78. The ETLS session key is then used by the ETLS servlet 78 to decrypt the service request and time-stamp. Preferably, a digital certificate from the primary server 74 was received and stored by the mobile device 72 when it first contacted the primary server 74 using a non-proprietary security protocol. Therefore, the identity of the primary server 74 has already been verified. The link is not yet secure, however, because a multi-pass handshake, such as the TLS handshake, was not used to negotiate the ETLS
session key and establish that the transmission is original. The ETLS servlet thus preferably protects against "replay" communications by comparing the decrypted service request and time-stamp with previous transmissions stored in the connection log 80. In this manner, if the ETLS servlet 78 receives an encrypted HTTP POST request that includes a service request and time-stamp that is identical to that of a previous transmission stored in the communication log, then the servlet 78 will recognize that the service request is not an original communication, and will preferably ignore the service request. In a preferred embodiment, the communication log stores all of the service requests and time-stamps received by the ETLS servlet 78 within a pre-determined time period.
Alternatively, the ETLS servlet 78 may save only the time-stamps or some other data, such as an ordinal number, indicating the originality of the transmission.
Once the HTTP POST request has been decrypted by the ETLS servlet 78 and compared with the previous transmissions stored in the connection log 80, a secure link between the mobile device and the ETLS servlet 78 has been established. The decrypted service request may then be transmitted from the ETLS servlet 78 to the primary server 74, which performs the desired operation and returns a response to the ETLS servlet 78. Because the ETLS servlet 78 and the primary server 74 operate behind the common firewall 82, the non-encrypted data may be securely transferred using a standard transfer protocol, such as HTTP. Once the response from the primary server 74 is received by the ETLS
servlet 78, it is encrypted with the ETLS session key and transmitted through the wireless gateway 76 to the mobile device 72. At the mobile device 72, the response is decrypted with the session key. Then, if a new service request is desired, a new session key may be generated by the mobile device 72, and the above described process repeated.
Fig. 5 is a flow diagram of an exemplary method for securely communicating between a mobile device and a network server using the ETLS
protocol. The method begins at step 92 in which communication is established between a mobile device and a network server operating on a computer network, such as the Internet. Once communication with the computer network has been established, the mobile device preferably accesses an internal memory location at step 100 to determine if an ETLS public key and an ETLS servlet URL have previously been saved for the particular network server. If so, then the mobile device recognizes that a secure link may be established using an ETLS servlet operating in connection with the server, and an ETLS handshake is performed starting at step 108. If the mobile device does not have a stored ETLS URL and public key for the server, however, then a secure socket should preferably be opened with the server using a non-proprietary security protocol, such as the TLS
protocol (step 102). After a secure socket has been negotiated with the server, the mobile device may then send an encrypted service request to which the server may respond with an encrypted TLS response (step 104). If the server is equipped with an ETLS servlet (step 106), then the TLS response sent by the server in step 104 will preferably include a custom HTTP response header that identifies the ETLS public key and the associated URL for the ETLS servlet, which is stored on the device in step 107. The device then waits for a request for the next connection at step 109. If the server is not equipped with an ETLS
servlet (step 106), however, the device preferably waits until the device requests the next connection at step 109.
At step 108, the mobile device preferably begins the ETLS handshake by generating a session key and encrypting it with the ETLS public key previously received from the server in the custom HTTP response header. At step 110, the service request from the mobile device and a digital time-stamp are both encrypted using the session key (step 110). The digital time-stamp preferably includes the time and date that the transmission takes place. Then, at step 112, the encrypted service request, time-stamp and session key are transmitted to the ETLS servlet, preferably in the form of an HTTP POST request or some other suitable transfer mechanism.
When the HTTP POST request is received by the ETLS servlet, the ETLS
session key is decrypted using a private key maintained exclusively by the ETLS
servlet, and the decrypted session key is then used to decrypt the service request and digital time-stamp (step 114). At step 116, the digital time-stamp is compared with those of previous transmissions stored in a connection log that is maintained by the ETLS servlet. If the time-stamp matches that of a previous transmission stored in the connection log, then the transmission is not original (step 118), and the service request is preferably ignored by the ETLS servlet (step 120). If the transmission is original (step .118), however, then the digital time-stamp is saved to the connection log (step 122) to prevent the transmission from being "replayed" in subsequent communications. In alternative embodiments, both the time-stamp and service request may be stored in the connection log and compared with the HTTP POST request, or the time-stamp may be replaced with some other means for determining that the request is original, such as an ordinal number.
In step 124, a secure link has been established and a fetch-response operation is performed between the ETLS servlet and the server to perform the function indicated in the service request from the mobile device. Then, in step 126 the response from the server is encrypted by the ETLS servlet using the session key and is transmitted to the mobile device. The response is decrypted by the mobile device at step 128, and a new service request may then be initiated by the mobile device at step 109.
The embodiments described herein are examples of structures, systems or methods having elements corresponding to the elements of the invention recited in the claims. This written description may enable those skilled in the art to make and use embodiments having alternative elements that likewise correspond to the elements of the invention recited in the claims. The intended scope of the invention thus includes other structures, systems or methods that do not differ from the literal language of the claims, and further includes other structures, systems or methods with insubstantial differences form the literal language of the claims.
A system and method for implementing an i;nhanced transport layer security (ETLS) protocol is provided. The system includes a primary server, an ETLS
servlet and an ETLS software module. The primary server operates on a computer network and is configured to communicate over the computer network using a non-proprietary security protocol. The ETLS servlet also operates on the computer network and is securely coupled to the primary server. The ETLS servlet is configured to communicate over the computer network using en ETLS security protocol. The ETLS software module operates on a mobile device, and is configured to communicate over the computer network using either the non-proprietary security protocol or the F;TLS security protocol.
Operationally, the ETLS software module initially contacts the server over the computer network sing the non-proprietary security protocol, and subsequently contacts the server through the ETLS
servlet using the ETLS security protocol.
In an aspect of the invention, there is provided a method for securely communicating with a server operating on a computer network, comprising the steps of providing a servlet that securely communicates witli the server; providing a connection log maintained by the servlet that stores one or more transmissions received by the servlet;
sending an encrypted transmission to the servlet ov.-r the computer network;
receiving the encrypted transmission at the servlet; decrypting th,, encrypted transmission with the servlet to generate a decrypted transmission; comparing the decrypted transmission with the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log to determine if the decrypted transmission is original; and if the decrypted transntission is original, then transferring the decrypted transmission from the servlet to the serve-r, wherein the servlet has a unique location on the computer network, and comprising :he additional step of receiving the unique location of the servlet from the server; wherein the unique location of the servlet is used to send the encrypted transmission to the servlet over the computer network.
In another aspect, there is provided a method for securely communicating between a mobile device and a server operating on a compuler network, comprising the steps of providing a security servlet operating on the computer network, wherein the security servlet communicates with the server via a secure link, and is identified by a unique location on the computer network; establishing a wireless connection between the mobile device and the computer network; establishing a secure connection between the mobile device and the server using a non-proprietary security protocol; sending a first encrypted service request from the mobile device to the server via the non-proprietary security protocol; sending a first encrypted response from the server to the mobile device that includes the unique location of the security servlet on the computer network;
sending a second encrypted service request from the mobile device to the security servlet using the unique location of the security servlet; decrypting the second encrypted service request with the security servlet to generate a decrypted sewice request; transferring the decrypted service request from the security servlet to the server.
In yet a further aspect, there is provided a s,,-cure server, comprising a primary server operating on a computer network; a security servlet operating on the computer network and securely coupled to the primary server and configured to decrypt an encrypted service request received from the computer network to generate a decrypted service request; and a connection log coupled to th,,- security servlet that stores one or more previous service requests received by the security servlet; wherein the security servlet first verifies that the encrypted service requ,-st is original by comparing the decrypted service request with the one or more pre vious service requests stored in the connection log, and then transfers the decrypted se:-vice request to the primary server;
wherein the security servlet is configured to decrypt a first service request type that is encrypted using a proprietary security protocol and the primary server is configured to decrypt a second service request type that is encrypted using a non-proprietary security protocol.
In yet a further aspect, there is provided an enhanced transport layer security (ETLS) system for a mobile device, comprising a frimary server operating on a computer network and configured to communicate over the computer network using a non-proprietary security protocol; an ETLS servlet operating on the computer network and securely coupled to the server, wherein the ETLS servlet is configured to communicate over the computer network using an ETLS security protocol; an ETLS software module operating on the mobile device that is configured to communicate over the computer network using either the non-proprietary security protocol or the ETLS
security protocol;
wherein the ETLS software module initially contacts the server over the computer network using the non-proprietary security protocol and subsequently contacts the server through the ETLS servlet using the ETLS security protocol.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
5a Fig. 1 is a signal flow diagram illustrating the basic steps typically used to establish a secure connection between a client and an Internet server using the TLS
protocol;
Fig. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a typical mobile communication system utilizing a wireless Application Protocol (WAP);
5b Fig. 3 is a signal flow diagram illustrating a wireless communication between a client and a server using an enhanced transport layer security ("ETLS") protocol;
Fig. 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary ETLS system illustrating a secure connection between a mobile device and an HTTP server using the ETLS
protocol; and Fig. 5 is a flow diagram of an exemplary method for securely communicating between a mobile device and a network server using the ETLS
protocol.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Referring now to the remaining drawing figures, Fig. 3 is a signal flow diagram 40 illustrating a wireless communication between a client 42 and a server 44 using an enhanced transport layer security ("ETLS") protocol. The client 42 may be any system operating on a mobile. device that is capable of wirelessly accessing a computer network. The server 44 preferably includes a primary server, such as an HTTP server 46, and an ETLS servlet 48, both operating on a computer network, such as the Internet. The ETLS servlet 48, discussed in more detail below with reference to Fig. 4, is preferably a JAVATM servlet operating on the HTTP server 46, but could alternatively be some other server-side mechanism such as a CGI script. The ETLS servlet 48 is preferably installed on the HTTP
server 46 with its own uniform resource locator (URL), which is added to a custom HTTP response header along with an ETLS public key.
In step 50, the client 42 attempts to open -a secure connection with the server 44. At this point, the client 42 has not yet detected the ETLS servlet 48, and, therefore, uses a non-proprietary security protocol such as the TLS
protocol.
The TLS four-pass handshake, discussed above with reference to Fig. 1, is performed in steps 50-56. In steps 50 and 52, the client 42 and the server 44 determine which operations or languages they have in common, and a TLS public key in a digital certificate is transferred to the client 42. In steps 54 and 56, a random TLS session key is negotiated. Then, in step 58 the initial service request from the client 42 is encrypted with the TLS session key and transmitted to the HTTP server 46. The HTTP server 46 decrypts the service request and transmits its initial encrypted response in step 60. Along with the encrypted data, the initial response 60 from the HTTP server 46 also includes the custom HTTP response header with the URL of the ETLS servlet 48. and the ETLS public key. The ETLS
public key is preferably generated by the ETLS servlet 48, and has an associated ETLS private key that is maintained exclusively by the ETLS servlet 48. The client 42 preferably stores the ETLS public key and associated URL in a memory location on the mobile device. Thereafter, each time the client 42 establishes a secure connection to the server 44, it uses the ETLS public key and associated URL to communicate through the ETLS servlet 48.
Steps 62-68 illustrate two secure ETLS transmissions between the client 42 and the server 44 after the ETLS public key and associated URL have been received and stored by the client 42. To establish a secure connection using the ETLS protocol, the client 42 first establishes a random ETLS session key and encrypts it with the ETLS public key received from the custom HTTP response header. The client 42 then uses the ETLS session key to encrypt the bulk data that makes up its service request to the server 44 and also to encrypt a digital time-stamp. In step 62, the client 42 transmits the data to the ETLS servlet, preferably in the form of an HTTP POST request that includes the encrypted session key, service request and time-stamp. Once the ETLS servlet 48 has received the HTTP POST request, the request is decrypted and compared to a connection log to establish that the transmission is original. At this point, the security of the communication has been established, and the ETLS servlet 48 may perform a fetch-response operation with the HTTP server 46. Then, once a response from the HTTP server 46 has been returned, the ETLS servlet 48 encrypts the response with the ETLS session key and transmits it to the client in step 64. The ETLS protocol, including the operations of the digital time-stamp and the connection log, are discussed in more detail below with reference to Fig.
4.
Steps 66 and 68 illustrate that each subsequent communication between the client 42 and the server 44 may be performed using the same two-step ETLS
handshake described above with reference to steps 62 and 64. In this manner, the ETLS protocol enables secure communications between a mobile device and an Internet server without requiring the lengthy, multiple transmissions commonly associated with non-proprietary security protocols, such as the TLS protocol.
Fig. 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary ETLS system 70 illustrating a secure connection between a mobile device 72 and an primary server 74 using the ETLS protocol. Cross-referencing Figs. 3 and 4, the ETLS system 70 shown in Fig. 4 illustrates the ETLS connections made in steps 62-68 of Fig. 3, and after the initial TLS connection shown in steps 50-60 of Fig. 3. The ETLS system 70 includes the mobile device 72, the primary server 74, a wireless gateway 76, the ETLS servlet 78 and the connection log 80. The primary server 74, ETLS servlet 78 and connection log 80 are located on a computer network, such as the Internet, and are preferably protected behind a common firewall 82. Communications between the mobile device 72 and the computer network are preferably made through the wireless gateway 76 using any known Web browser-type software designed for use on a mobile device. The mobile device 72 preferably also includes an ETLS software module 71 that is configured to establish a secure connection with the compiuter network using either the ETLS protocol or a non-proprietary security protocol such as the TLS protocol.
To send a service request to the primary server 74 using the ETLS
protocol, the mobile device 72 preferably establishes a random ETLS session key that it uses to encrypt the service request, and encrypts the session key using the stored ETLS public key for the ETLS Servlet 78. In addition, to protect against "rep,lay" communications, an electronic time-stamp -is also preferably generated by the mobile device and encrypted using the ETLS session key. Then, the encrypted service request, session key and time-stamp are all bundled in an HTTP
POST request, or some other suitable transfer mechanism, and transmitted through the wireless gateway 76 to the ETLS servlet 78.
When the HTTP POST request is received at the ETLS serviet 78, the ETLS session key is preferably decrypted with the ETLS private key that is maintained by the ETLS servlet 78. The ETLS session key is then used by the ETLS servlet 78 to decrypt the service request and time-stamp. Preferably, a digital certificate from the primary server 74 was received and stored by the mobile device 72 when it first contacted the primary server 74 using a non-proprietary security protocol. Therefore, the identity of the primary server 74 has already been verified. The link is not yet secure, however, because a multi-pass handshake, such as the TLS handshake, was not used to negotiate the ETLS
session key and establish that the transmission is original. The ETLS servlet thus preferably protects against "replay" communications by comparing the decrypted service request and time-stamp with previous transmissions stored in the connection log 80. In this manner, if the ETLS servlet 78 receives an encrypted HTTP POST request that includes a service request and time-stamp that is identical to that of a previous transmission stored in the communication log, then the servlet 78 will recognize that the service request is not an original communication, and will preferably ignore the service request. In a preferred embodiment, the communication log stores all of the service requests and time-stamps received by the ETLS servlet 78 within a pre-determined time period.
Alternatively, the ETLS servlet 78 may save only the time-stamps or some other data, such as an ordinal number, indicating the originality of the transmission.
Once the HTTP POST request has been decrypted by the ETLS servlet 78 and compared with the previous transmissions stored in the connection log 80, a secure link between the mobile device and the ETLS servlet 78 has been established. The decrypted service request may then be transmitted from the ETLS servlet 78 to the primary server 74, which performs the desired operation and returns a response to the ETLS servlet 78. Because the ETLS servlet 78 and the primary server 74 operate behind the common firewall 82, the non-encrypted data may be securely transferred using a standard transfer protocol, such as HTTP. Once the response from the primary server 74 is received by the ETLS
servlet 78, it is encrypted with the ETLS session key and transmitted through the wireless gateway 76 to the mobile device 72. At the mobile device 72, the response is decrypted with the session key. Then, if a new service request is desired, a new session key may be generated by the mobile device 72, and the above described process repeated.
Fig. 5 is a flow diagram of an exemplary method for securely communicating between a mobile device and a network server using the ETLS
protocol. The method begins at step 92 in which communication is established between a mobile device and a network server operating on a computer network, such as the Internet. Once communication with the computer network has been established, the mobile device preferably accesses an internal memory location at step 100 to determine if an ETLS public key and an ETLS servlet URL have previously been saved for the particular network server. If so, then the mobile device recognizes that a secure link may be established using an ETLS servlet operating in connection with the server, and an ETLS handshake is performed starting at step 108. If the mobile device does not have a stored ETLS URL and public key for the server, however, then a secure socket should preferably be opened with the server using a non-proprietary security protocol, such as the TLS
protocol (step 102). After a secure socket has been negotiated with the server, the mobile device may then send an encrypted service request to which the server may respond with an encrypted TLS response (step 104). If the server is equipped with an ETLS servlet (step 106), then the TLS response sent by the server in step 104 will preferably include a custom HTTP response header that identifies the ETLS public key and the associated URL for the ETLS servlet, which is stored on the device in step 107. The device then waits for a request for the next connection at step 109. If the server is not equipped with an ETLS
servlet (step 106), however, the device preferably waits until the device requests the next connection at step 109.
At step 108, the mobile device preferably begins the ETLS handshake by generating a session key and encrypting it with the ETLS public key previously received from the server in the custom HTTP response header. At step 110, the service request from the mobile device and a digital time-stamp are both encrypted using the session key (step 110). The digital time-stamp preferably includes the time and date that the transmission takes place. Then, at step 112, the encrypted service request, time-stamp and session key are transmitted to the ETLS servlet, preferably in the form of an HTTP POST request or some other suitable transfer mechanism.
When the HTTP POST request is received by the ETLS servlet, the ETLS
session key is decrypted using a private key maintained exclusively by the ETLS
servlet, and the decrypted session key is then used to decrypt the service request and digital time-stamp (step 114). At step 116, the digital time-stamp is compared with those of previous transmissions stored in a connection log that is maintained by the ETLS servlet. If the time-stamp matches that of a previous transmission stored in the connection log, then the transmission is not original (step 118), and the service request is preferably ignored by the ETLS servlet (step 120). If the transmission is original (step .118), however, then the digital time-stamp is saved to the connection log (step 122) to prevent the transmission from being "replayed" in subsequent communications. In alternative embodiments, both the time-stamp and service request may be stored in the connection log and compared with the HTTP POST request, or the time-stamp may be replaced with some other means for determining that the request is original, such as an ordinal number.
In step 124, a secure link has been established and a fetch-response operation is performed between the ETLS servlet and the server to perform the function indicated in the service request from the mobile device. Then, in step 126 the response from the server is encrypted by the ETLS servlet using the session key and is transmitted to the mobile device. The response is decrypted by the mobile device at step 128, and a new service request may then be initiated by the mobile device at step 109.
The embodiments described herein are examples of structures, systems or methods having elements corresponding to the elements of the invention recited in the claims. This written description may enable those skilled in the art to make and use embodiments having alternative elements that likewise correspond to the elements of the invention recited in the claims. The intended scope of the invention thus includes other structures, systems or methods that do not differ from the literal language of the claims, and further includes other structures, systems or methods with insubstantial differences form the literal language of the claims.
Claims (69)
1. A method for securely communicating with a server operating on a computer network, comprising the steps of:
providing a servlet that securely communicates with the server;
providing a connection log maintained by the servlet that stores one or more transmissions received by the servlet;
sending an encrypted transmission to the servlet over the computer network;
receiving the encrypted transmission at the servlet;
decrypting the encrypted transmission with the servlet to generate a decrypted transmission;
comparing the decrypted transmission with the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log to determine if the decrypted transmission is original; and if the decrypted transmission is original, then transferring the decrypted transmission from the servlet to the server, wherein the servlet has a unique location on the computer network, and comprising the additional step of:
receiving the unique location of the servlet from the server;
wherein the unique location of the servlet is used to send the encrypted transmission to the servlet over the computer network.
providing a servlet that securely communicates with the server;
providing a connection log maintained by the servlet that stores one or more transmissions received by the servlet;
sending an encrypted transmission to the servlet over the computer network;
receiving the encrypted transmission at the servlet;
decrypting the encrypted transmission with the servlet to generate a decrypted transmission;
comparing the decrypted transmission with the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log to determine if the decrypted transmission is original; and if the decrypted transmission is original, then transferring the decrypted transmission from the servlet to the server, wherein the servlet has a unique location on the computer network, and comprising the additional step of:
receiving the unique location of the servlet from the server;
wherein the unique location of the servlet is used to send the encrypted transmission to the servlet over the computer network.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the encrypted transmission is sent to the servlet from a mobile device through a wireless gateway coupled to the computer network.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the servlet is installed on the server.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the computer network is an Internet.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the server and servlet are protected within the computer network by a firewall.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the servlet is a JAVA servlet.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the servlet is a CGI script.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the server is an HTTP server.
9. The method of claim 1, comprising the additional step of;
storing the decrypted transmission in the connection log.
storing the decrypted transmission in the connection log.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log each comprise a stored time-stamp;
the decrypted transmission comprises a current time-stamp; and the current time-stamp is compared with each of the stored time-stamps to determine if the decrypted transmission is original.
the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log each comprise a stored time-stamp;
the decrypted transmission comprises a current time-stamp; and the current time-stamp is compared with each of the stored time-stamps to determine if the decrypted transmission is original.
11. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log each comprise a stored time-stamp and a stored service request;
the decrypted transmission comprises a current time-stamp and a current service request; and the current time-stamp and the current service request are compared with each stored time-stamp and stored service request to determine if the decrypted transmission is original.
the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log each comprise a stored time-stamp and a stored service request;
the decrypted transmission comprises a current time-stamp and a current service request; and the current time-stamp and the current service request are compared with each stored time-stamp and stored service request to determine if the decrypted transmission is original.
12. The method of claim 1, wherein the unique location is a uniform resource locator (URL).
13. The method of claim 1, wherein the unique location is received from the server in the form of a custom HTTP response header.
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the servlet maintains a private key, and comprising the additional steps of:
receiving a public key; and using the public key to encrypt the encrypted transmission;
wherein the servlet uses the private key to decrypt the encrypted transmission.
receiving a public key; and using the public key to encrypt the encrypted transmission;
wherein the servlet uses the private key to decrypt the encrypted transmission.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein the public key is received from the server in the form of a custom HTTP response header.
16. The method of claim 1, wherein the servlet maintains a private key, and comprising the additional steps of:
receiving a public key;
generating a session key;
using the session key to encrypt a service request;
using the public key to encrypt the session key; and encapsulating the encrypted session key and the encrypted service request in the encrypted transmission;
wherein the servlet uses the private key to decrypt the session key and uses the decrypted session key to decrypt the service request.
receiving a public key;
generating a session key;
using the session key to encrypt a service request;
using the public key to encrypt the session key; and encapsulating the encrypted session key and the encrypted service request in the encrypted transmission;
wherein the servlet uses the private key to decrypt the session key and uses the decrypted session key to decrypt the service request.
17. The method of claim 16, wherein the one or more transmissions stored in the connection log each comprise a stored time-stamp, and comprising the additional steps of:
generating a current time-stamp; and using the session key to encrypt the current time-stamp;
wherein the encrypted current time-stamp is encapsulated in the encrypted transmission along with the encrypted session key and the encrypted service request, and wherein the current time-stamp is decrypted by the servlet and compared with each stored time-stamp to determine if the decrypted transmission is original.
generating a current time-stamp; and using the session key to encrypt the current time-stamp;
wherein the encrypted current time-stamp is encapsulated in the encrypted transmission along with the encrypted session key and the encrypted service request, and wherein the current time-stamp is decrypted by the servlet and compared with each stored time-stamp to determine if the decrypted transmission is original.
18. The method of claim 16, wherein the session key is a random number.
19. The method of claim 16, wherein the public key is received from the server in the form of a custom HTTP response header.
20. The method of claim 16, wherein the encrypted transmission is sent to the servlet in the form of an HTTP POST request.
21. The method of claim 1, comprising the additional steps of:
generating a response to the decrypted transmission at the server;
transferring the response from the server to the servlet;
encrypting the response with the sevlet;
receiving the encrypted response from the servlet over the computer network.
generating a response to the decrypted transmission at the server;
transferring the response from the server to the servlet;
encrypting the response with the sevlet;
receiving the encrypted response from the servlet over the computer network.
22. The method of claim 1, comprising the additional step of:
retrieving a digital certificate from the server using a non-proprietary security protocol.
retrieving a digital certificate from the server using a non-proprietary security protocol.
23. The method of claim 22, wherein the non-proprietary security protocol is the transport layer security (TLS) protocol.
24. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure communication is made between the server and a mobile device.
25. A method for securely communicating between a mobile device and a server operating on a computer network, comprising the s~eps of:
providing a security servlet operating on the computer network, wherein the security servlet communicates with the server via a secure link, and is identified by a unique location on the computer network;
establishing a wireless connection between the mobile device and the computer network;
establishing a secure connection between the mobile device and the server using a non-proprietary security protocol;
sending a first encrypted service request from the mobile device to the server via the non-proprietary security protocol;
sending a first encrypted response from the server to the mobile device that includes the unique location of the security servlet on the computer network;
sending a second encrypted service request from the mobile device to the security servlet using the unique location of the security servlet;
decrypting the second encrypted service request with the security servlet to generate a decrypted service request;
transferring the decrypted service request from the security servlet to the server.
providing a security servlet operating on the computer network, wherein the security servlet communicates with the server via a secure link, and is identified by a unique location on the computer network;
establishing a wireless connection between the mobile device and the computer network;
establishing a secure connection between the mobile device and the server using a non-proprietary security protocol;
sending a first encrypted service request from the mobile device to the server via the non-proprietary security protocol;
sending a first encrypted response from the server to the mobile device that includes the unique location of the security servlet on the computer network;
sending a second encrypted service request from the mobile device to the security servlet using the unique location of the security servlet;
decrypting the second encrypted service request with the security servlet to generate a decrypted service request;
transferring the decrypted service request from the security servlet to the server.
26. The method of claim 25, wherein the second encrypted service request is encrypted using a proprietary security protocol.
27. The method of claim 25, comprising the additional step of:
storing the unique location of the security servlet in a memory location on the mobile device.
storing the unique location of the security servlet in a memory location on the mobile device.
28. The method of claim 25, comprising the additional step of:
receiving a digital certificate from the server using the non-proprietary security protocol.
receiving a digital certificate from the server using the non-proprietary security protocol.
29. The method of claim 25, wherein the unique location of the security servlet on the computer network is a uniform resource locator (URL).
30. The method of claim 25, wherein the non-proprietary security protocol is the transport layer security (TLS) protocol.
31. The method of claim 25, wherein the non-proprietary security protocol is the SSL
protocol.
protocol.
32. The method of claim 25, wherein the first encrypted response from the server includes a custom HTTP response header that identifies the unique location of the security servlet on the computer network.
33. The method of claim 25, wherein the decrypted service request is transferred from the security servlet to the server using a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) connection.
34. The method of claim 25, wherein a plurality of additional encrypted service requests are sent from the mobile device to the security servlet, decrypted by the security servlet and transferred to the server.
35. The method of claim 25, comprising the additional step of:
verifying the originality of the second encrypted service request by comparing it with a connection log maintained by the security servlet.
verifying the originality of the second encrypted service request by comparing it with a connection log maintained by the security servlet.
36. The method of claim 25, wherein an encrypted current time-stamp is sent from the mobile device to the security servlet along with the second encrypted service request, and comprising the additional step of:
verifying the originality of the second encrypted service request by decrypting the encrypted current time-stamp and comparing it with a connection log maintained by the security servlet.
verifying the originality of the second encrypted service request by decrypting the encrypted current time-stamp and comparing it with a connection log maintained by the security servlet.
37. The method of claim 25, wherein the wireless connection between the mobile device and the computer network is made through a wireless network.
38. The method of claim 25, wherein:
the first encrypted response from the server also includes a public key;
the security servlet has a private key configured to decrypt data that has been encrypted using the public key; and the second encrypted service request is encrypted by the mobile device using the public key, and is decrypted by the security servlet using the private key.
the first encrypted response from the server also includes a public key;
the security servlet has a private key configured to decrypt data that has been encrypted using the public key; and the second encrypted service request is encrypted by the mobile device using the public key, and is decrypted by the security servlet using the private key.
39. The method of claim 38, wherein the step of sending the second encrypted service request from the mobile device to the security servlet comprises the additional steps of:
generating a session key;
encrypting a service request with the session key;
encrypting the session key with the public key;
encapsulating the encrypted service request and the encrypted session key according to a transfer mechanism to form the second encrypted service request; and transmitting the second encrypted service request from the mobile device to the security servlet;
wherein the encrypted session key is decrypted by the security servlet using the private key and the encrypted service request is decrypted by the security servlet using the session key, and wherein the service request is transferred from the security servlet to the server.
generating a session key;
encrypting a service request with the session key;
encrypting the session key with the public key;
encapsulating the encrypted service request and the encrypted session key according to a transfer mechanism to form the second encrypted service request; and transmitting the second encrypted service request from the mobile device to the security servlet;
wherein the encrypted session key is decrypted by the security servlet using the private key and the encrypted service request is decrypted by the security servlet using the session key, and wherein the service request is transferred from the security servlet to the server.
40. The method of claim 39, wherein a current time-stamp is also encrypted with the session key and encapsulated in the second encrypted service request, and wherein the current time-stamp is compared with a connection log by the security servlet to verify the originality of the second encrypted service request.
41. The method of claim 39, wherein the second encrypted service request is sent to the security servlet in the form of an HTTP POST request.
42. The method of claim 39, comprising the additional steps of:
generating a response to the service request at the server;
transferring the response from the server to the servlet;
encrypting the response using the session key;
sending the encrypted response from the security servlet to the mobile device.
generating a response to the service request at the server;
transferring the response from the server to the servlet;
encrypting the response using the session key;
sending the encrypted response from the security servlet to the mobile device.
43. A secure server, comprising:
a primary server operating on a computer network;
a security servlet operating on the computer network and securely coupled to the primary server and configured to decrypt an encrypted service request received from the computer network to generate a decrypted service request; and a connection log coupled to the security servlet that stores one or more previous service requests received by the security servlet;
wherein the security servlet first verifies that the encrypted service request is original by comparing the decrypted service request with the one or more previous service requests stored in the connection log, and then transfers the decrypted service request to the primary server;
wherein the security servlet is configured to decrypt a first service request type that is encrypted using a proprietary security protocol and the primary server is configured to decrypt a second service request type that is encrypted using a non-proprietary security protocol.
a primary server operating on a computer network;
a security servlet operating on the computer network and securely coupled to the primary server and configured to decrypt an encrypted service request received from the computer network to generate a decrypted service request; and a connection log coupled to the security servlet that stores one or more previous service requests received by the security servlet;
wherein the security servlet first verifies that the encrypted service request is original by comparing the decrypted service request with the one or more previous service requests stored in the connection log, and then transfers the decrypted service request to the primary server;
wherein the security servlet is configured to decrypt a first service request type that is encrypted using a proprietary security protocol and the primary server is configured to decrypt a second service request type that is encrypted using a non-proprietary security protocol.
44. The secure server of claim 43, wherein the security servlet is installed on the primary server.
45. The secure server of claim 43, wherein the non-proprietary security protocol is the TLS protocol.
46. The secure server of claim 43, wherein the security servlet maintains a public-private key pair specific to the proprietary security protocol and the primary server maintains a public-private key pair specific to the non-proprietary security protocol.
47. The secure server of claim 43, wherein the computer network is an Internet.
48. The secure server of claim 43, wherein the computer network is an Intranet.
49. The secure server of claim 43, wherein the primary server and the security servlet are protected within the computer network by a fire wall.
50. The secure server of claim 49,wherein the security servlet is coupled to the primary server using an HTTP connection.
51. The secure server of claim 43, wherein the security servlet is a JAVA
servlet.
servlet.
52. The secure server of claim 43, wherein the primary server is an HTTP
server.
server.
53. The secure server of claim 43, wherein:
the decrypted service request includes a current time-stamp;
the one or more previous service requests each include a stored time-stamp;
and the security servlet verifies that the encrypted service request is original by comparing the current time-stamp with each stored time-stamp.
the decrypted service request includes a current time-stamp;
the one or more previous service requests each include a stored time-stamp;
and the security servlet verifies that the encrypted service request is original by comparing the current time-stamp with each stored time-stamp.
54. The secure server of claim 43, wherein:
the decrypted service request is assigned a current ordinal number;
the one or more previous service requests each include a previous ordinal number;
and the security servlet verifies that the encrypted service request is original by comparing the current ordinal number with each previous ordinal number.
the decrypted service request is assigned a current ordinal number;
the one or more previous service requests each include a previous ordinal number;
and the security servlet verifies that the encrypted service request is original by comparing the current ordinal number with each previous ordinal number.
55. An enhanced transport layer security (ETLS) system for a mobile device, comprising:
a primary server operating on a computer network and configured to communicate over the computer network using a non-proprietary security protocol;
an ETLS servlet operating on the computer network and securely coupled to the server, wherein the ETLS servlet is configured to communicate over the computer network using an ETLS security protocol;
an ETLS software module operating on the mobile device that is configured to communicate over the computer network using either the non-proprietary security protocol or the ETLS security protocol;
wherein the ETLS software module initially contacts the server over the computer network using the non-proprietary security protocol and subsequently contacts the server through the ETLS servlet using the ETLS security protocol.
a primary server operating on a computer network and configured to communicate over the computer network using a non-proprietary security protocol;
an ETLS servlet operating on the computer network and securely coupled to the server, wherein the ETLS servlet is configured to communicate over the computer network using an ETLS security protocol;
an ETLS software module operating on the mobile device that is configured to communicate over the computer network using either the non-proprietary security protocol or the ETLS security protocol;
wherein the ETLS software module initially contacts the server over the computer network using the non-proprietary security protocol and subsequently contacts the server through the ETLS servlet using the ETLS security protocol.
56. The system of claim 55, wherein the ETLS software module communicates with the computer network through a wireless gateway.
57. The system of claim 55, wherein the ETLS servlet is installed on the primary server.
58. The system of claim 55, wherein the computer network is an Internet.
59. The system of claim 55, wherein the computer network is an Intranet.
60. The system of claim 55, wherein the primary server and the ETLS servlet are protected within the computer network by a firewall.
61. The system of claim 55, wherein the ETLS servlet is a JAVA servlet.
62. The system of claim 55, wherein the primary server is an HTTP server.
63. The system of claim 55, wherein communications transmitted from the primary server include a header that indicates a unique rescurce locator (URL) for the ETLS
servlet.
servlet.
64. The system of claim 55, wherein communications transmitted from the primary server include a digital certificate.
65. The system of claim 55, wherein the ETLS software module detects whether the computer network includes the ETLS servlet.
66. The system of claim 63, wherein the header is a custom HTTP response header.
67. The system of claim 55, wherein the primary server maintains a public-private key pair specific to the non-proprietary security protocol, and the ETLS servlet maintains a public-private key pair specific to the ETLS security protocol.
68. The system of claim 55, further comprising:
a connection log coupled to the ETLS server that stores one or more previous ETLS transmission received by the ETLS server, wherein the ETLS server uses the connection log to verify the originality of a current ETLS transmission.
a connection log coupled to the ETLS server that stores one or more previous ETLS transmission received by the ETLS server, wherein the ETLS server uses the connection log to verify the originality of a current ETLS transmission.
69. The system of claim 55, further comprising:
a connection log coupled to the ETLS server that stores one or more time-stamps associated with previous ETLS transmissions received by the ETLS server, wherein the ETLS server compares each stored time-stamp with a current time-stamp to verify the originality of a current ETLS transmission.
a connection log coupled to the ETLS server that stores one or more time-stamps associated with previous ETLS transmissions received by the ETLS server, wherein the ETLS server compares each stored time-stamp with a current time-stamp to verify the originality of a current ETLS transmission.
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