Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy AnalysisPolycentric Games and Institutions summarizes contributions to the analysis of institutions made by scholars associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. The readings in this volume illustrate several varieties of institutional analysis. Each reading builds upon the foundation of game theory to address similar sets of questions concerning institutions and self-governance. The chapters in the first section lay out interrelated frameworks for analysis. Section two illustrates the normative component of institutions and their effects on human behavior. Readings in the following two sections detail how these frameworks have been applied to models of specific situations. Section five presents a modeling exercise exploring the functions of monitoring and enforcement, and the sixth section discusses approaches to the problems of complexity that confront individuals playing polycentric games. The final readings provide overviews of experimental research on the behavior of rational individuals. Contributors include Arun Agrawal, Sue E. S. Crawford, Clark C. Gibson, Roberta Herzberg, Larry L. Kiser, Michael McGinnis, Stuart A. Marks, Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, James Walker, Franz J. Weissing, John T. Williams, and Rick Wilson. Michael McGinnis is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Co-Associate Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. |
Contents
I | 1 |
II | 23 |
III | 34 |
IV | 56 |
V | 89 |
VI | 114 |
VII | 157 |
VIII | 168 |
XIII | 275 |
XIV | 285 |
XV | 308 |
XVI | 331 |
XVII | 336 |
XVIII | 366 |
XIX | 399 |
XX | 421 |
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action situation actors ADMADE agenda allocation alternative appropriation behavior benefits collective action collective choice common-pool resources contracts cooperation correlated equilibrium costs decision situation delta parameters DEONTIC Development distribution Economic effect efficiency Elinor Ostrom empirical enforcement essay example experimental experiments external farmers FERC game models game theory Gardner grim trigger groundwater guard incentives individuals institutional analysis institutional arrangements institutional statements interactions irrigation irrigation systems Journal Management McGinnis ment Michigan Press mixed strategy monitoring nambardar Nash equilibrium norms optimal organization outcomes participants payoffs percent pipeline players Plott Political Science Polycentric predicted preferences Prisoner's Dilemma problem Public Choice pure strategies rational reciprocity rules sanctioning scouts shared shepherds Shepsle social choice social dilemmas stealing rate stock quota strategies structure subgame perfect equilibrium theoretical tion turnwaiters users variables village scouts voting Walker wildlife Workshop Zambia