Checking Iran's Nuclear AmbitionsHenry D. Sokolski, Patrick Clawson DIANE Publishing - 139 pages Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is simply one that's come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no longer a credible strategy. The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted (including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran's example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weapons- related capabilities. |
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Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Henry Sokolski,Patrick Clawson,Strategic Studies Institute No preview available - 2014 |
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Popular passages
Page 27 - Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.
Page 36 - Pursuant to article 8, design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits for the provision of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.
Page v - The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies...
Page 130 - He served in the White House during the first Reagan administration and was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council Staff.
Page 131 - HENRY D. SOKOLSKI is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues for academics, policymakers, and the media. He served from 1989 to 1993 as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and earlier in the Office of Net Assessment and as a legislative military aide in the US Senate. Mr. Sokolski has authored...
Page 29 - ... be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development. The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts established — even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in nature — could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons effort. • Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This project will not directly support...
Page v - Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.
Page 103 - There are today Americans who are held against their will in foreign lands, and Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here, and will be long remembered. Good will begets good will.
Page 37 - Statement by John A. Lauder, Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Russian Proliferation to Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs, October 5, 2000. 17. Livermore, 2000. 18. 1995 Livermore report: "Extraction and Utility of Reactor-Grade Plutonium for Weapons" (U) (see for example, http://www.thoriumpower.com/files/ tech percent20plutoniumblications/reactor'_plutonium.pdf).
Page 127 - Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Report by the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/34, Vienna, 1 June 2004, p.