Rules, Games, and Common-pool ResourcesExplores ways that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided by people who use common-property resources |
Contents
Institutional Analysis | 23 |
Games Appropriators Play | 51 |
Rules and Games | 75 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action arenas action situation adopted agreement allocation appropriation externalities arrow assignment problems authority rules baseline behavior boundary rules chapter coastal collective-choice Common-Pool Resources complex cooperation costs CPR dilemmas CPR problems CPR situations decision Development discussion Economic effect enforcement environment experimental experiments field settings fishers fishing grounds fishing spots fodder game theory grim trigger groundwater groundwater basins harvesting incentives individuals investment irrigation irrigation systems Journal Management Market measured reaction ment models Mojave River Nash equilibrium operational-level rules optimal Orange County organized Ostrom outcomes panchayat participants payoff percent physical play player predictions Prisoner's Dilemma provision problems pumpers pumping rational Raymond Basin repeated game Research resource units round rule configuration rule violations sanctioning mechanism Schlager Social specific storage structure subgame perfect equilibrium subgroups subjects symmetric equilibrium technological externalities theoretical tion tokens trigger strategies types University Press users variables villages yield