Moral UncertaintyAbout the bookToby Ord try to fill this gap. They argue that there are distinctive norms that govern how one ought to make decisions and defend an information-sensitive account of how to make such decisions. They do so by developing an analogy between moral uncertainty and social choice, noting that different moral views provide different amounts of information regarding our reasons for action, and arguing that the correct account of decision-making under moral uncertainty must be sensitive to that. Moral Uncertainty also tackles the problem of how to make intertheoretic comparisons, and addresses the implications of their view for metaethics and practical ethics. Very often we are uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We do not know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how strong our duties are to improve the lives of distant strangers, or how to think about the ethics of bringing new people into existence. But we still need to act. So how should we make decisions in the face of such uncertainty? Though economists and philosophers have extensively studied the issue of decision-making in the face of uncertainty about matters of fact, the question of decision-making given fundamental moral uncertainty has been neglected. In Moral Uncertainty, philosophers William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord try to fill this gap. They argue that there are distinctive norms that govern how one ought to make decisions and defend an information-sensitive account of how to make such decisions. They do so by developing an analogy between moral uncertainty and social choice, noting that different moral views provide different amounts of information regarding our reasons for action, and arguing that the correct account of decision-making under moral uncertainty must be sensitive to that. Moral Uncertainty also tackles the problem of how to make intertheoretic comparisons, and addresses the implications of their view for metaethics and practical ethics. |
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according action agent animals appropriate argue argument assume attitude belief blaming Borda Rule certitude chapter choice choice-worthiness function choose claim comparable completely concerning consider correct credence decision decision-making decision-making under moral desire discussion eating empirical equal ethics example expected choice-worthiness expected utility face fact favour gaining give given human idea important incomparable intertheoretic comparisons interval-scale intuitively issue least less lives matter maximize means measure merely moral theories moral uncertainty moral views natural normalize normative Note objection one's option particular perfect information permissible person philosophical plausible positive possible preferences Press problem properties question rational reason reject relevant represent risk saving scale score seems sense Sepielli simply situation social strength structural accounts suggested suppose Table treat true uncertain unit University utilitarianism variance vegetarian voting welfare worthiness wrong