The Structure of Appearance, Volume 53

Front Cover
Springer Netherlands, Sep 30, 1977 - Philosophy - 285 pages
With this third edition of Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appear ance, we are pleased to make available once more one of the most in fluential and important works in the philosophy of our times. Professor Geoffrey Hellman's introduction gives a sustained analysis and appreciation of the major themes and the thrust of the book, as well as an account of the ways in which many of Goodman's problems and projects have been picked up and developed by others. Hellman also suggests how The Structure of Appearance introduces issues which Goodman later continues in his essays and in the Languages of Art. There remains the task of understanding Good man's project as a whole; to see the deep continuities of his thought, as it ranges from logic to epistemology, to science and art; to see it therefore as a complex yet coherent theory of human cognition and practice. What we can only hope to suggest, in this note, is the b. road Significance of Goodman's apparently technical work for philosophers, scientists and humanists. One may say of Nelson Goodman that his bite is worse than his bark. Behind what appears as a cool and methodical analysis of the conditions of the construction of systems, there lurks a radical and disturbing thesis: that the world is, in itself, no more one way than another, nor are we. It depends on the ways in which we take it, and on what we do.

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About the author (1977)

Nelson Goodman's work develops themes in philosophy of science, mind, art, and language. Born in Massachusetts, he was educated at Harvard University and had an early career as an art dealer. After military service during World War II, he chose the academic life and taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Brandeis University before returning to Harvard in 1968. Goodman's early work grows out of logical positivism. His paradox presents a difficulty for inductive logic. It is developed by showing that an empirical statement can be expressed by more than one set of words and that its' degree of confirmation can depend on the words used to express it---not solely on its content or the supporting evidence. Scientific method thus intersects the philosophy of language. On this basis, Goodman develops a sophisticated nominalism (a view stressing the power of language to determine meaning), which remains solidly within the analytic tradition. His philosophy of language also develops themes of construction and simplicity. Goodman's later work contains an original treatment of representation. In asking how an original can be represented in perception, language, or art, he argues that there is no straightforward relation between the original and its representation. Understanding a photograph as a representation, for example, is neither simple nor intuitive. Representations, to be understood as such, must be interpreted instead within a network of more or less conventional rules.

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