First Philosophy II: Knowledge and Reality - Second Edition: Fundamental Problems and Readings in PhilosophyAndrew Bailey First Philosophy: Knowledge and Reality brings together classic and ground-breaking readings on epistemology and the philosophy of science. Andrew Bailey’s highly regarded introductory anthology has been revised and updated in this new edition. The comprehensive introductory material for each chapter and selection remains, and new sections on philosophical puzzles and paradoxes and philosophical terminology have been added. New readings include Edmund Gettier on justified true belief, Wesley Salmon on induction, and Helen Longino on feminist science. |
Contents
EpistemologyIs the External World the Way It Appears to | 15 |
Epistemologyls the External World the Way It Appears to | 26 |
John Locke | 54 |
George Berkeley | 72 |
Immanuel Kant | 97 |
Bertrand Russell | 114 |
G E Moore | 129 |
Gettier | 145 |
Philosophy of ScienceWhen if Ever Are Scientific Inferences Justified? | 169 |
Carl Hempel | 206 |
Wesley Salmon | 238 |
S Peirce | 253 |
Philosophical Puzzles and Paradoxes | 297 |
Philosophical Lexicon | 313 |
Image Credits | 343 |
Lorraine Code | 151 |
Other editions - View all
First Philosophy II: Knowledge and Reality - Second Edition ..., Volume 2 Andrew Bailey Limited preview - 2011 |
First Philosophy II: Knowledge and Reality: Fundamental Problems and ... Andrew Bailey Limited preview - 2004 |
Common terms and phrases
after-images answer argue argument Author’s note belief Berkeley Berkeley’s Bertrand Russell body called cause claim colours concept conclusion confirmation consider critical David Hume deductive Descartes distinct doubt effect ence epistemological evidence example exist experience external fact faculty false feel feminist follows G.E. Moore grue heat Hempel human Hume Hume’s HYLAS hypothesis ideas imagination important inductive inferences inquiry judgments justified Kant Kant’s kind knower knowledge Kuhn laws Locke logical mathematics matter means ment merely metaphysics method mind motion nature never observation pain particular Peirce perceived perception perhaps PHILONOUS philosophical philosophy of science physical objects Popper possible prediction principle priori problem of induction produce proof proposition prove question rational reality refutation riddle of induction rules Russell’s scientific scientists seems sensation sense sense-data sensible qualities simply sort statement substance supposed synthetic synthetic proposition things thought tion true truth understand University Press valid women’s