Rules, Games, and Common-pool ResourcesExplores ways that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided by people who use common-property resources |
Contents
Rules Games and CommonPool Resource Problems | 3 |
Institutional Analysis and CommonPool Resources | 23 |
Games Appropriators Play | 51 |
Rules and Games | 75 |
CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments | 105 |
Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR | 129 |
Communication in the Commons | 145 |
Sanctioning and Communication Institutions | 171 |
Fishers Institutional Responses to CommonPool Resource Dilemmas | 247 |
Rules Rule Making and Rule Breaking Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use | 267 |
Changing Rules Changing Games Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California | 283 |
Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations | 301 |
Cooperation and Social Capital | 319 |
Bibliography | 331 |
Contributors | 361 |
| 363 | |
Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations | 195 |
Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems | 225 |
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Common terms and phrases
action arenas action situation agreement allocation analysis appropriation externalities arrow assignment problems authority rules Average Net Yield behavior boundary rules chapter choice collective-choice Common-Pool Resources complex constituent game cooperation costs CPR dilemmas CPR problems CPR situations develop discussion Economic effect enforce experimental farmer-owned field settings fishers fishing grounds fishing spot forest game theory go to spot government-owned grim trigger groundwater harvesting incentives individuals institutional irrigation irrigation systems Journal Management measured reaction ment models Mojave River Nash equilibrium noncooperative game one-shot communication operational rules operational-level rules optimal Orange County organized Ostrom outcomes panchayat participants payoff percent play player Policy predictions Prisoner's Dilemma provision problems pumpers rational repeated game resource units round rule configuration sanctioning mechanism Schlager specific structure Studies subgame perfect subgame perfect equilibrium subjects symmetric equilibrium technological externalities theoretical tion trigger strategies types users V₁ v₂ villages