Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions

Original publisher: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, [2004] OCLC Number: (OCoLC)54463583 Subject: Nuclear arms control -- Iran. Excerpt: ... the IAEA or not ) unless or until they fi rst surrender all of the nuclear capabilities they previously gained while a member of the treaty; authorizing the imposition of UN and UN member state economic penalties against states the IAEA has identifi ed as no longer clearly being in full compliance with their NPT obligations on a progressive basis, starting with small measures ( e.g., a ban on loans from international fi nancial institutions ) and escalating to harsher measures; and, creating a P-5 NPT secretariat to see to it that above measures are actually implemented. The aim of these resolutions ( and their development, which would take several months ) would be three-fold. First, their development and adoption should help deter further violation of the NPT by Iran and spell out what action the UNSC would take when the IAEA fi nally determines Iran's compliance status. Second, they ( and their country-neutral character ) should help deter Iran's neighbors, or other nations, who might otherwise be tempted to hedge their security bets by acquiring a nuclear weapons option of their own. Third, they should help give the Russians and the Europeans additional justifi cation for withholding preferential trade and nuclear cooperation from Iran if it persists in developing a nuclear weapons option. Finally, for reasons detailed later in this report, it is clear from the evidence the IAEA has found already that the agency ultimately will have to conclude that Iran is no longer clearly in full compliance with its NPT obligations, i.e., that Iran is in violation. This, in turn, should trigger the sanction responses detailed above. 2. Encourage Iranians to debate the merits of their nuclear power program and support of terrorism. The IAEA demands made of Iran at its last board of governors ' m...