A Treatise of Human Nature |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
actions advantage agreeable allow'd appear argument arises attended beauty belief betwixt body cause and effect cerning circumstances cism common concerning conclusion conjoin'd connexion consequently consider consider'd constant conjunction contiguity continu'd existence contrary cou'd degree deriv'd distinct encrease entirely equal establish'd esteem esteem'd experience explain'd fancy farther feel force and vivacity human nature identity imagination immediately impressions and ideas inference infinite divisibility influence injustice instances interest judgment justice kind love and hatred manner matter mind moral motion never nexion obligation observ'd observe operation opinion original ourselves pain particular passions perceive perceptions person phænomenon philosophy plac'd pleasure possession pride and humility principle probability proceed produc'd produce propensity qualities reason reflection regard relation of ideas resemblance sceptical SECT sensation senses sensible sentiments shew shou'd society species suppos'd suppose sympathy thing thought tion tis evident tis impossible transition twill uneasiness vice virtue wou'd
Popular passages
Page 417 - Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Page 254 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
Page 255 - The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance ; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.
Page 271 - Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation and lively impression of my senses, which obliterates all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends ; and when, after three or four hours...
Page 255 - The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind ; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.
Page 471 - So that •when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.
Page 471 - In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a god, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is...
Page 174 - A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
Page 271 - Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.
Page 459 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already proved, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.